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PREFACE 
Rising hospital costs are a national problem of 
growing concern. During the past decade economists have 
begun to examine certain relationships between hospital 
firm structure and production efficiency. This study 
focuses on some of these relationships in the context of a 
specific hospital sub-industry, nuclear medicine. 
I am indebted to my major advisor, Dr. Joseph M. 
Jadlow, for his constructive evaluation and encouragement 
during the entire research effort. Also, I wish to express 
my appreciation to Dr. John C. Shearer for his guidance in 
the early stages of the study and to Dr. Michael J. Apple-
gate for his suggestions regarding the statistical sections 
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clarity of the presentation. Many other members of the 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Amid rapidly rising hospital costs, a restructuring 
of the hospital service delivery system has been frequently 
suggested to stimulate production efficiency. 1 The Ameri-
can College of Radiology has particularly emphasized the 
importance of "the development of ••• a complete, work-
able, and efficient nuclear medicine service for patients 
and for training in nuclear medicine." 2 Proposals from 
the Committee for Economic Development (CED), and others, 
have suggested that hospital efficiency could be improved 
if the hospital industry were restructured in order to: 
1. reduce capacity and service competition among 
hospitals, 
2. develop profit and cost-risk incentives, 
3. reduce service range and consolidate specialized 
services, and 
4. reorganize in-house manpower training.3 
Although such changes seem consistent with promoting cost 
efficiency, a paucity of data concerning the relationship 
of internal structure to technical efficiency makes the 
empirical significance of these proposals difficult to 
assess. 
1 
2 
To relate empirically differences in hospital struc-
ture to technical production efficiency, comparable inputs 
and outputs must be identified. Since hospital care is a 
nonhomogeneous product, simple measures of efficiency are 
not available. Past studies of hospital efficiency have 
measured output in patient days, sometimes adjusted for 
case-mix. 4 Because it has remained impossible to define a 
homogeneous industry output, results obtained from these 
studies are tentative. 
Scope of the Study 
This research utilizes an alternative approach for 
examining the relationship of hospital internal structure 
to production efficiency. The hospital industry consists 
of multiproduct firms selling various intermediate health 
care services in many markets. If separate industries can 
be identified for specific outputs, then a study of indi-
vidual hospital subindustries is feasible. This research 
examines internal structure and performance relationships 
for a hospital subindustry, nuclear medicine. The objec-
tive is to measure the significance of specific elements 
of hospital structure on technical efficiency in the pro-
duction of nuclear medicine. Although it is impossible to 
generalize the result over all areas of hospital produc-
tion, the findings should supplement existing knowledge 
about efficiency in the hospital industry. 
The nuclear medicine industry can be conceived as a 
3 
set of production units operating as a part of a multi-
product hospital firm. The industry's primary labor input 
is the nuclear medical technician/technologist occupa-
tional cluster. This group administers the diagnostic and 
therapeutic services and, in a majority of hospitals, is 
the only nonphysician manpower input. The capital input 
consists of specialized equipment designed to prepare, 
administer, monitor, and report on services produced. 
Service outputs consist of specialized diagnostic and 
therapeutic procedures. As these procedures require a 
standard format, they are substantially invariant among 
firms. Because inputs and outputs are relatively homoge-
neous and because little substitution is possible on 
either the input or output side, an industry made up of 
comparable firms is defined. 
Research Hypotheses 
The research for this study tests four specific 
hypotheses relating hospital structure to production effi-
ciency in nuclear medicine. The four research hypotheses 
are: 
1. Increased competitive intensity reduces technical 
efficiency. 
2. A lack of profit incentive reduces technical 
efficiency. 
3. A broader service range reduces technical 
efficiency. 
4. In-house training of technical personnel reduces 
technical efficiency. 
First, because buyers of hospital services are not 
attracted on the basis of price, competitive pressures to 
minimize cost are reduced. Hospitals obtain customers 
from physician referrals and, therefore, may compete for 
staff physicians. This competition creates inefficiency 
if it induces overinvestment in staff and equipment. 
4 
If the hypothesis is correct, then greater competition for 
staff physicians should be associated with reduced effi-
ciency in the nuclear medical industry. 
Second, hospitals that are subject to a profit con-
straint will tend to minimize costs of output to expand 
profit margins, thereby inducing increased efficiency. 
Without a profit motivation, the constraints to cost mini-
mization and efficiency maximization are not imposed. 
Third, it is argued that a hospital with a broad 
range of outputs is likely to be less efficient than one 
specialized in fewer services. A hospital which produces 
all services may be equipped to handle peak demands for 
each and may experience extended periods of excess 
capacity. If a specialized hospital can arrange a 
steadier flow of output, it will suffer less idle time. 
The hypothesis implies that specialized nuclear medicine 
producers should exhibit greater efficiency than non-
specialized producers. 
Fourth, because training is a joint output with 
5 
nuclear medicine, a given service output might require more 
resource inputs in a training intensive hospital. If 
training programs do increase costs, then nuclear medicine 
units with relatively larger training programs should 
exhibit reduced production efficiency. 
Analytical Framework 
The examination of these hypotheses requires a statis-
tical method for making relative efficiency estimates. For 
efficiency comparisons a set of output response surfaces 
analogous to production functions is derived for firms 
operating under each structural condition, and the para-
meters of these functions are statistically compared. An 
output response function is a statement of the relationship 
between rates of input and output. Because firms cannot be 
assumed to minimize cost, the fitted function does not 
represent the maximum output possible from resource inputs. 
Therefore, it is not a true production function. The para-
metric constants identify the average output from given 
rates of input for the industry, or segment of the indus-
try, under analysis. Significant differences in function 
parameters for firms operating under different structural 
conditions imply differences in technical efficiency. 
Chapter II reviews selected literature relating hos-
pital structure to efficiency and presents a theoretical 
statement of the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter III 
develops the technique of analysis and data measurement to 
be used for the empirical tests. Chapter IV presents the 
empirical findings and examines tests for the appropriate-
ness of the statistical model. Chapter V summarizes the 
conclusions and recommendations of the research. 
6 
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FOOTNOTES 
1Karen Davis, "Rising Hospital Costs: Possible Causes 
and Curest" Brookings Reprint Series (Washington D. C., 
May, 1973J, P• 1362. 
2American College of Radiology, "Regionalization in 
Nuclear Medicine" (Washington D. c., 1973), p. 1. 
3committee for Economic Development, Buildin~ a 
National Health Care System (New York, April, 197 ), p. 18. 
4Judith and Lester Lave, "Economic Analysis for Health 
Service Efficiency," Applied Economics, I (1970), p. 293. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY 
This chapter introduces a concept of the hospital 
firm, reviews the problem of defining homogeneous hospital 
outputs, and examines current literature pertaining to 
hospital behavior, structure, and efficiency. This chapter 
develops a theoretical basis for evaluating the four 
hypotheses of the study, and in Chapter IV the a priori 
results developed in this chapter are compared with empiri-
cal statistical observations. 
The Hospital Firm 
The hospital industry consists of 7,637 hospital units 
averaging 163 beds per unit. About three-fourths of the 
units are "short-term general hospitals." 1 Individual 
institutions range in size from under twenty to over five 
hundred beds and produce various intermediate health care 
services used in the production of a final product, medical 
care. Geographic market boundaries are determined by 
patient referral areas. While proprietary, private non-
profit, and government hospitals operate in the market, the 
dominant type by number, patient load, and bed capacity is 
the private nonprofit hospital. 2 
9 
The concept of the firm has been difficult to define 
in hospital industry studies. The administrative unit of a 
hospital differs from the traditional firm decision maker 
in that it cannot determine the actual output of various 
services. The hospital management is limited to the crea-
tion of service capacity through its acquisition of produc-
tion inputs. Actual output is dependent on physician 
choices of hospital services as they provide medical care 
for individual patients. Therefore, while the hospital 
administration selects the quantity of primary resources, 
the actual utilization of resources is not hospital deci-
sion. The relevant firm depends on a specification of in-
puts and outputs. The physician directs the use of hospi-
tal services as intermediate inputs for the final product, 
medical care. 3 The hospital management, however, selects 
the labor and capital resources as inputs to the production 
of the intermediate services. As this study is concerned 
with the choice of primary inputs acquired by hospitals for 
nuclear medicine production, the individual hospital 
management serves as the firm. The range, quality, and 
intensity of inputs utilized in providing service capacity 
is the primary determinate of the hospital cost function. 
An expansion in the range, quantity or quality of inputs 
available, other things constant, must increase the per 
unit cost of hospital services. 
10 
Technical Efficiency 
This study focuses on the technical efficiency with 
which hospitals under various structural conditions combine 
resources in the production of nuclear medicine. A concept 
of technical efficiency for a single firm in an industry 
requires the specification of input-output relationships, 
factor prices, and product prices. A production function 
is described by a responsive surface showing the relation-
ship between various rates of resource utilization and the 
maximum rate of output, as: 4 
( 1) 
where Q is output and x1 , x2, and x3 are input quantities. 
Given the output price, the set of factor prices, r 1 , r 2 , 
and r 3 , and the budget constraint, C, the most efficient 
input-output combination can be found, where 
and 
The first order condition for output maximization results 
in: 
( 4) 
The fi are the marginal physical products of the resource 
11 
inputs. Hence, Equation (4) represents the law of equi-
marginal products. Necessary and sufficient conditions for 
constrained output maximization are: 
0 r1 r2 r3 0 r1 r2 
r1 f11 f12 f13 
r1 f11 f12 > 0 and < o. 
r2 f21 f22 f23 
f21 f22 r2 
r3 f31 f32 f33 
To maximize technical efficiency firms must respond to and 
hire resources on the basis of marginal productivities per 
dollar of resource cost. Moreover, they must operate on 
the production function. 5 
Hospitals are believed to have little incentive to 
produce each intermediate service with maximum technical 
efficiency. Three sources of deviation are generally 
possible. First, there is a possibility of differences in 
technical production constraints among hospitals. If some 
hospitals are constrained to less efficient production 
techniques, then their observed output must lie below the 
production function of a more technically efficient insti-
tution. Because of rapid advances in medical technology, 
such a difference might be possible. Clarkson, however, 
comments that a large quantity of technical information 
reaches hospitals in well-developed channels. 6 Therefore, 
the state of technical knowledge tends to be common to all 
hospitals. 
Second, and more likely, it is possible that some 
12 
hospitals do not respond to changes in factor prices by 
equating marginal productivities per dollar of resource 
cost. Ogur states that the derivation of production func-
tions for nonprofit hospitals is impossible from input 
price data.? Nonprofit hospitals ignore factor prices and 
choose input combinations based on nonprice variables. 
Clarkson has found that nonprofit hospitals do not seek and 
are unaware of market information about resource prices and 
that such hospitals will not respond to changes in prevail-
. f . 8 1ng actor pr1ces. Rice, alternatively, observes that 
hospitals do alter input utilization in response to changes 
in relative input prices. 9 In spite of conflicting opin-
. ions, the bulk of the literature and economic logic sug-
gests that hospitals do respond to differences in factor 
prices. Even if the objective is not profit or net revenue 
maximization, other cost constraints may induce cost mini-
mization. 
The third and most commonly conceived form of ineffi-
ciency is the over-accumulation of inputs for the produc-
tion of a given output. Over-accumulation of inputs pro-
vides the primary way in which a hospital can visually 
demonstrate, to the physician staff and to the community 
served, the quality of care that it offers. Because an 
output oriented concept of quality is difficult to observe, 
hospitals concentrate on the accumulation (and the over-
accumulation) of input capacity. As Davis states, "The 
quantity of inputs used in the production of a given level 
13 
of output is used to denote quality.nlO 
Since a hospital is a multiproduct firm, it can avoid 
cost constraints for individual specialized outputs. How-
ever, if a hospital faced a break even constraint for each 
service, then revenue from the service would have to be 
sufficient to cover its production cost. If specialized 
but loss-producing services are desired as indicators of 
overall hospital quality, they can be covered by net 
revenue from "ordinary production" areas. The proposition 
set forth here is that divergences from the true nuclear 
medicine production function can be related systematically 
to specific elements of hospital structure. Such diver-
gence would indicate differences in technical production 
constraints or in capacity accumulation incentives. With 
respect to the problem of hospital inflation, greater tech-
nical efficiency would reduce pressure on costs and prices. 
The Problem of Homogeneity 
The most frequently cited empirical problem in studies 
of hospital efficiency is the specification of a homogene-
ous product. Commenting on the empirical analysis of the 
hospital industry, Clarkson states, "All hospitals do not 
produce the same product ••• [but] the implications 
require that the groups of firms tested produce similar 
outputs." 11 Several factors contribute to the heterogene-
ity of commonly used measures of hospital output. Varia-
tions in the quality of factor inputs may cause differences 
14 
in units of specific intermediate outputs across hospitals. 
More significantly, however, the intensity of intermediate 
go~d utilization may vary substantially among diagnoses and 
patients. Because each hospital produces a variety of 
specialized goods used in treating many types of disorders, 
relatively few services are common to all patients. Even 
for specific disease categories, variations in care inten-
sity, seriousness, and input utilization reduce hospital 
output homogeneity. 
Four approaches have been used to define a homogeneous 
unit of hospital output for empirical study. First, and 
most common, is the measurement of total bed capacity or 
patient days. The use of available beds or patient days as 
the unit of hospital output is not satisfactory since a 
general hospital provides as many types of care as there 
are diseases. 12 Rafferty states: 
There is a general ahd growing displeasure with 
commonly used methods by which hospital output is 
measured, and, therefore, with methods of measur-ing hospital costs. This disaffection springs 
largely from the questionable assumption of homo-geneity that is implied when output is measured 
in the traditional units (number of patients or patient days of care), for it is increasingly 
evident that output is not homogeneous in this 
respect.13 
A second approach, used by Ingbar and Taylor, measures 
output for each patient as the sum of services performed 
for the patient. 14 The idea is to measure each output in 
dollar terms as the sum of its dollar intermediate service 
values. The methodology avoids the problem of variations 
15 
in the intermediate good mix used for treatment of a spe-
cific patient or disorder category. However, Mann and Yett 
note that this procedure merely states a tautology. If 
output is defined in dollar terms as the sum of intermedi-
ate service values, then no variations in output per unit 
of input could be observed (except for statistical error). 
Since resources would appear to be used with equal effi-
ciency in all cases, this approach has little empirical 
application to variations in technical efficiency. 15 
To avoid the problem of differences in the intermedi-
ate service mix, P. Feldstein and Carr have focused on 
specialized hospitals with similar production inputs. If 
similar input capacity indicates similar outputs, then the 
homogeneity problem is reduced. Lave and Lave point out 
that similarities in specialized facilities is consistent 
with significant variations in care type and intensity. 16 
Even for the same input capacity, differences in case 
severity, cure procedure, or actual intermediate service 
utilization could imply different final products. 
A fourth alternative suggests the adjustment of 
hospital patient days on the basis of diagnostic categor-
ies. To estimate a hospital production function, M. Feld-
stein has divided patient days into nine admittance cate-
gories, with patient days weighted according to a standard 
marginal cost of treatment. 17 Feldstein found that varia-
tions in case mix produce significant differences in 
resource utilization and cost. Rafferty has used three 
16 
methods for diagnostic category adjustment. In each 
adjustment he found that case mix variations caused signif-
icant differences in resource intensity. 18 These results 
suggest that studies using patient days alone have not 
identified a homogeneous good. Although the adjusted 
patient day approach has been more favorably received for 
reducing final output heterogeneity, it does not overcome 
all the problems of differences within each case type. The 
assumption of a standard set of inputs for a single dis-
order is questionable. The definition of a series of out-
put categories does not insure common intermediate service 
utilization even within those categories. Newhouse states, 
"This is an aggregation problem inherent in a multiproduct 
firm, since treatment of each diagnosis can be a separate 
product." l9 
The trade-off between data availability and degree of 
homogeneity is a particular problem in the empirical appli-
20 cation of the adjusted patient day measure. A detailed 
set of narrowly defined case types might produce reasonable 
homogeneity. However, the existence of thousands of diag-
nostic categories creates the statistical problems of small 
numbers, empty sets, and difficulty in obtaining data. 
The use of a smaller and more manageable set of diagnoses 
reduces the statistical problems at the cost of reduced 
homogeneity. 
As an alternative, this research measures input and 
output rates in a single hospital subindustry. The 
17 
hospital manager chooses among available input combinations 
to produce a specific intermediate hospital service, 
nuclear medicine. Since the input decision is made by the 
hospital manager in response to physician demand, observed 
differences in input-output relationships are directly 
related to managerial decisions. Moreover, the nuclear 
medicine industry produces a set of identifiable, rela-
tively homogeneous outputs. Lee has suggested such an 
approach and conceives of specialized production functions 
for each intermediate hospital good. Newhouse adds, "Dis-
tinct cost and demand curves must be analyzed for each 
separate product." 21 Since units of nuclear medicine 
differ only to the extent of qualitative variations in pri-
mary resources, the major problem of patient care heteroge-
neity is avoided. 
The Nuclear Medicine Industry 
Nuclear medicine is a specific hospital intermediate 
product. The nuclear medicine industry is a hospital sub-
industry in which radioactive isotopes and x-ray procedures 
are used to produce a set of diagnostic and therapeutic 
services. Approximately, 2,050 short-term general 
hospitals are known to produce nuclear medicine outputs. 
The generalized production function for the nuclear 
medicine industry is Q. = f(L., K., M.), where i is the ith l. l. l. l. 
output, Q is total quantity, and L, K, and M are labor, 
capital, and other inputs, respectively. Aside from 
18 
physician input, the primary labor resource used in produc-
tion is the nuclear medical technician/technologist occupa-
tional cluster. Although minimum employment standards 
vary, and associate or baccalaureate degree and clinical 
experience are normally required. Professional society 
registration and an internship period are frequently 
required. The capital input consists of a variety of spe-
cialized equipment designed to prepare, administer, moni-
tor, and report on the services applied. The specializa-
tion of resource inputs precludes their substitution with 
non-specialized inputs. The industry output is a set of 
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, with each requiring 
a standard routine and input of other resources. Although 
procedure formats are relatively standardized, there is 
considerable latitude for labor and capital substitution. 
The availability of labor saving devices offers hospital 
decision makers a choice of input combinations and produc-
tion technologies. 
Because output procedures follow standardized form'ats, 
and because output of each specific type provides a homoge-
neous intermediate input to the production of medical care, 
an industry is defined. The organization unit for firms in 
the industry are the individual hospital decision makers. 
The hospital managements acquire labor and capital inputs 
to provide nuclear medicine services in response to 
expected demands of physician users. 
19 
Theories of Hospital Behavior 
The effects of structural characteristics on hospital 
performance depend on the actions and objectives of hos-
pital managers. Past studies of hospital production rela-
tionships have been handicapped by the absence of a gener-
ally accepted theory of hospital behavior. The problem 
results from difficulty in specifying property rights in an 
industry characterized as nonprofit and noncompetitive and 
is complicated by confusion over the relevant firm decision 
maker. The major theories of hospital behavior are 
reviewed, and each of the research hypotheses is examined 
in the context of the behavior models. 
First, it has been suggested that hospitals attempt to 
maximize sales or output. Long has proposed a current out-
put maximization objective. He states that the guiding 
principle for a hospital board of trustees is to upromote 
the social welfare by serving as many patients as possi-
ble."22 The major constraint is that a hospital cannot run 
a deficit. 23 Reder suggests a modified output maximization 
objective where the number of patients treated per unit is 
"weighted by the prestige of the attending physicians.•• 24 
Rice extends the output maximization hypothesis by assuming 
that a hospital is like a business firm in that it faces 
specific technical production constraints and will attempt 
to minimize the cost of its desired level of output. In 
addition, community pressure, professional requirements, 
20 
and accreditation standards force the hospital to maximize 
its output of standard quality services. The minimum 
quality assumption is common to theoretical works suggest-
ing output, profit, and net revenue maximization objec-
tives. A final constraint induces production below the 
maximum rate in order to generate net returns (or surplus) 
for capacity expansion. If the desired surplus were 
greater than or equal to the maximum possible surplus, the 
profit maximizing output would be chosen. Rice's idea of 
a minimum surplus constraint provides a long-run version of 
the output maximization hypothesis by considering the need 
f . . 25 or capac1ty expans1on. The hypothesis that hospitals 
must generate a minimum surplus is consistent with the 
observation that about fifty percent of capacity expansion 
in non-profit hospitals is purchased with internally 
26 generated funds. The model requires cost minimization 
for the desired volume of output, as a violation would 
impair the objective of maximum output subject to the 
minimum surplus constraint. Without further refinement, 
these constraints seem inconsistent with the excess capac-
ity observed in many hospitals. 
Alchian has suggested that the use of available 
resources involves more than constrained output maximiza-
tion.27 Hired managers may focus on a number of elements 
that affect their personal return. The sales maximization 
constraint alone is ~nconsistent with other economic theory 
and logic as it supposes that no reduction in sales, 
irrespective of its effect on profit or surplus, would be 
undertaken. Instead, the hired manager maximizes a 
personal·utility function in which returns depend on 
several varfables and include both pecuniary and nonpecu-
21 
niary benefits. Pecuniary returns represent present and 
expected increases in personal wealth (e.g. salary, posi-
tion security, and opportunity for advancement). Nonpecu-
niary returns (e.g. job satisfaction, pursuit of pleasant 
tasks, and attraction ~f congenial associates) enter the 
utility function and, within limits, are substitutes for 
pecuniary returns. The hired manager can increase his 
total ut~lity while simultaneously increasing firm net 
returns or at the expense of net returns, particularly if 
his own reward does not depend on profit. 
The emphasis of the Alchian analysis is that both 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns are sought by firm 
decision makers. More important, the substitution rate 
between these returns is nonzero, and the return set can be 
altered by managerial us~ of resources. 28 Two lines of 
development for hospital behavior theory are implied. One 
line focuses on the determinants of managerial utility 
.. 
while the other line focuses on the differences in 
managerial constraints among hospitals. 
Newhouse has specified a utility function in a theory 
of hospital behavior, where total managerial utility 
depends on pecuniary and nonpecuniary rewards. 29 The 
manager will manipulate hospital resources to receive 
22 
personal income and job advancement rewards. He may simul-
taneously gain personal satisfaction from a sense of pride 
in serving the community interest, attracting staff of out-
standing qualifications, or receiving professional recogni-
tion. Both forms of return are hypothesized to depend on 
the prestige of the hospital served. Prestige, in turn, 
depends on the measurable aspects of hospital performance, 
primarily output quantity and quality. Profit or surplus 
is not the usual standard for performance measurement and 
will be pursued only as a means of expanding quantity or 
quality.· 
Hospital behavior will differ from the quantity maxi-
mization model because quality explicitly enters the 
manager's utility function. Quality is pursued for two 
reasons. First, quality increases demand and actual out-
put. Newhouse states, "Differences in quality levels 
generate demand."JO Demand is increased because prestige 
attracts physicians and patient referrals. In addition, 
quality i~ desired sin~e it produces utility independently 
of its effect on demand. The output of various price-
quantity-quality combinations that a hospital would be 
able to sell implies a feasibility set from which the 
administrator chooses on the basis of his utility function. 
In a similar vein Lee has presented a "Conspicuous 
Production" theory of hospital behavior.3l Total manage-
rial utility is dependent on the status of the hospital 
unit. Status must be demonstrated on the basis of visible 
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objects or symbols, such as service capacity, input range, 
and input quality. Hence, attention is focused on the 
accumulation of status-producing assets. 
Because of difficulty in measuring quality in an out-
put sense, proponents of the utility maximization hypothe-
sis have begged the question of defining output quality. 
Most of the quality maximization hypotheses interpret 
quality as the quantity of inputs per unit of hospital out-
put. Newhouse has discussed several criteria indicative of 
quality, such as personnel and capital inputs per patient 
day.3 2 Feldstein has called quality a "catchall term to 
denote the capacity for output and intensity of input as 
well as expenditure on professional staff."33 Both of 
these interpretations emphasize the quantity of labor and 
capital inputs used for service production. Davis states, 
"the production of higher quality requires primarily 
capital [and] use of labor in producing a given level of 
output." 34 The probability of cure would provide a more 
meaningful concept of quality bu~ is difficult to measure 
and has not been empirically applied. 
Lee has summarized the importance of including quality 
as a separate utility variable. Given a budget constraint 
for the sum of its intermediate service capacities, a 
hospital will use funds so that the marginal dollar spent 
on each service area gives the same addition to managerial 
utility. Therefore, a change in relative resource prices 
would induce input substitution. However, since the 
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utility added by marginal units of input may depend on the 
contribution to profit, output, and quality, a hospital 
cannot be supposed to minimize the cost of a given quantity 
of output alone. 35 A greater emphasis on the quality ele-
ments of status will lower average product and raise aver-
age cost because of overcapitalization and overstaffing. 
An alternative application of the Alchian concepts 
provides a theory of hospital behavior which focuses on 
formal managerial constraints. Clarkson has observed that 
hospital objectives are not clearly defined and that per-
formance is difficult to measure. 36 Sets of formal rules 
for managerial action are used as a substitute for profit 
incentives to guide the use of firm resources. Differences 
in hospital structure create systematic differences in the 
form of established rules, the behavior of hospital man-
agers, and the efficiency of resource utilization.37 
Therefore, an analysis of formal operating rules is essen-
tial to an understanding of hospital behavior.JS 
This s~udy is concerned with the relationship of spe-
cific elements of hospital structure to technical effi-
ciency in the production of nuclear medicine. The theories 
of hospital behavior provide theoretical indications of the 
relationship between the four structural elements to be 
examined and technical efficiency. 
Competition 
The first hypothesis of the study states that 
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"increased competition reduces technical efficiency" in the 
production of nuclear medicine. Until recently, little 
attention has been given to the effect of competition on 
hospital behavior.39 It has been assumed that most hos-
pitals are voluntary, nonprofit institutions and that they 
have little incentive to compete for customers. "Because 
competitive pressures are reduced or absent, hospitals may 
not strive to attain minimum costs of production."40 Some 
studies have gone so far as to equate the nonprofit status 
with noncompetitiveness. 41 Others have suggested a; stimu-
lus to hospital competition as an inducement to cost 
discipline. 
i 
Traditional microeconomic theory defines seller compe-
tition as the pre~sure exerted as each alternative seller 
tries to offer the most attractive alternative to potential 
buyers. Because sellers are forced to attract buyers on 
the basis of price, they seek to maximize technical effi-
ciency and to minimize production costs. However, in the 
market for hospital care, individual patients are unable 
to choose from among available hospital alternatives. For 
the medical industry as a whole, individual hospital ser-
vices are intermediate products. The physician selects 
the hospital and set of hospital services to be used in 
the production of medical care. Hence, the emphasis of 
hospital competition is on the attraction of staff physi-
cians. 42 
i 
If some capacity is accumulated to attrac~t 
physician staff, irrespective of actual use, then 
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competition for staff reduces technical efficiency. 
The sales maximization model implies two effects as 
the nuclear medicine capacity expands. A direct effect 
occurs if sales maximization and cost minimization are 
applied to nuclear medicine independently of other hospital 
outputs. More competitive hospitals are compelled to use 
more and better resources for nuclear medicine production 
in order to attract patient referrals. The degree of com-
petitive challenge will determine the effect of changes in 
service quality and capacity on demand, as well as on cost 
and price. Since increased resource utilization has the 
effect of raising average cost, an output maximizing 
hospital will add to its nuclear medicine capacity as long 
as there is a corresponding increase in demand and output. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the expected effect of increased input 
intensity in noncompetitive and competitive hospitals, 
respectively. Price elasticities are assumed to be nonzero 
for both markets over the relevant range of demand. 43 The 
less competitive hospital is assumed to have a more inelas-
tic demand since patients and physicians cannot readily 
choose other alternatives in response to price changes. 
Although average cost increases at the same rate for both 
as quality and capacity expand, little increase in demand 
is possible for the noncompetitive hospital. Its demand 
curve, by definition, represents the market demand. Since 
the competitive firm does not service the entire market, 
its demand can be increased by the attraction of staff 
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physicians and their patient referrals. Average cost pric-
ing is assumed in the figures, but the same result would 
apply to maximum profit or minimum cost constraint pricing. 
Davis sugges~s that the availability of specialized 
inputs may increase the demand for other hospital 
products.44 Because physicians serve on the staff of only 
one or two hospitals, the choice of association may depend 
on the capacity and range of service production. "The main 
way a hospital can attract more doctors is by increasing 
the specialized equipment it has." 45 Therefore, an in-
crease in nuclear medicine capacity may have the additional 
effect of attracting staff and referrals for a range of 
hospital services. Although a noncompetitive hospital 
currently faces the market demand for each of its inter-
mediate outputs, the competitive hospital may be able to 
expand the demand for services as its nuclear medicine 
. . . d 46 capac~ty ~s ~ncrease • 
The utility maximization theory includes quality as an 
explicit variable which affects managerial return. The 
administrator's preferences for quantity and quality can be 
visualized as a quality-quantity indifference map. The 
feasible combinations of quality and quantity can be 
derived by varying quality .and observing the effect on 
quantity sold. Quality can be interpreted as the accumu-
lation of those inputs which enhance the apparent ability 
of the hospital to produce output (e.g. input intensity, 
variety, and complexity). ·Although initial increases in 
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quality may expand patient referrals and demand, successive 
increases in costs and service prices will eventually 
reduce sales. Figure 3 shows the attainable quality-sales 
combinations under the assumption of average cost pricing. 
The relative movements of the demand and cost curves and 
the elasticity of demand will determine the new equilibrium 
quantity. 47 
The exact shape of the possibilities set is partially 
dependent on the degree of competition. Since a noncom-
petitive hospital faces the market demand for a particular 
output, higher quality will increase demand only if new 
customers are induced to participate in the market. There-
fore, reductions in quantity demanded are likely to out-
weigh increases in demand. For the competitive firm an 
increase in quality will attract staff and patient 
referrals from other hospitals (if other hospitals do not 
alter input utilization). Hence, a given quality change 
would have a more expansionary effect on the sales volume 
of a competitive firm. Figure 4 illustrates the difference 
where F represents the noncompetitive feasibility locus and 
F' represents the competitive feasibility locus. Xm repre-
sents the input combination meeting minimum standard 
quality for all hospitals, and X0 represents the initial 
quality-quantity combination. Indifference curves I, II, 
and III represent the manager's preferences for quantity 
and quality. If preference orderings are similar for both 
administrators, the competitive hospital will choose a 
31 
AC' 
AC 
Quantity per Unit Time 
Quantity per Unit Time 
Figure 3. Quality-Quantity Feasibility Set 
F' 
F 
I 
I I 
-----------------,~r-1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-----------------1 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
Quantity per Unit Time 
Figure 4. The Effect of Competition on the Quantity-
Quality Feasibility Set 
32 
33 
higher quality input combination, as illustrated in Figure 
4. Lee describes such accumulation as offensive or inde-
pendently motivated. The leading hospital in a market area 
attempts to enlarge or secure its current physician staff 
or to expand its status. 
The selected quantity-quality combination also repre-
sents a greater quality bias than in the output maximiza-
tion model since quality gives real managerial utility. 
The difference in behavior is illustrated in Figure 5. If 
the administrator is faced with a minimum quality con-
straint but derives no direct utility from quality, his in-
difference map is represented by the L-shaped curves i, ii, 
and iii. On the other hand, if he derives utility from 
quality above the minimum standard, the more normally 
shaped curves (I, II, and III) describe his preference set. 
When quality gives independent satisfaction, it is likely 
that higher quality will be substituted for quantity, as 
illustrated. Davis states that a quality-quantity maximiz-
ing hospital will tend to offer a lower quantity of care 
than one emphasizing quantity alone, as Figure 5 shows. 
It will also use more inputs (to demonstrate higher 
quality) in providing any level of service.48 
The assumption of unchanged resource utilization by 
other hospitals deserves consideration. If one hospital 
in a market area increases its stock of inputs, other 
hospitals may be expected to follow. Lee states that this 
• defensive reaction might be a stronger incentive than the 
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offensive motivation for capacity accumulation in competi-
tive hospitals. 49 A defensive accumulation response would 
alter the position of the quantity-quality feasibility 
locus for each competitive hospital. The expansion of 
demand created by offensive asset accumulation would.be 
offset as other hospitals responded defensively. But the 
costs for all would rise as accumulation occurs. This 
result is pictured in Figure 6. 
Irrespective of competitive intensity, the least cost 
resource combination for the desired quality-quantity com-
bination might be chosen. However, since competition 
encourages a quality bias, competitive hospitals will 
exhibit higher input accumulations and costs per unit of 
output. Lee has shown that hospitals do overaccumulate 
some specialized inputs. Although the result was not 
systematically related to competition, Lee found that in 
1961, thirty per cent of the 777 hospitals equipped to 
handle open heart surgery did not have a single case during 
the year. 50 
The managerial constraint model indicates a similar 
competitive effect. The primary objective for proprietary 
hospitals is the maximization of net returns. Since the 
managerial objective is clear and measurable, managerial 
action is guided without an extensive set of formal rules. 
In pursuit of returns the competitive proprietary firm has 
a stronger incentive to accumulate assets as long as 
marginal revenue increases more rapidly than marginal cost. 
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Long-run net revenue maximization may be consistent with 
overcapacity in a competitive environment. Moreover, if 
status in a competitive market provides an alternative 
managerial objective, the manager may try to accumulate 
visible status subject to a profit constraint.5l 
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Clarkson has demonstrated that nonproprietary hospi-
tals are more dependent on sets of formal regulations for 
managerial guidance. 52 If hospital trustees in competitive 
markets feel pressure to pursue the status objective, then 
the set of guidelines will be status oriented. Even if 
the emphasis of specific rules does not vary with competi-
tive intensity, competition will create incentives for 
excess capacity accumulation, particularly if managerial 
performance is difficult to measure. The dependence of 
hospital behavior on the arrangement of formal rules is 
consistent with excess capacity and reduced technical effi-
ciency in more highly competitive hospitals.53 
Profit Orientation 
The second hypothesis of the study states that "a lack 
of profit incentive reduces technical efficiency." The 
bulk of the literature relating hospital structure to 
efficiency has concentrated on the effect of a profit 
orientation. Most studies rely on theoretical assertions 
about differences in resource use in proprietary and non-
proprietary hospitals and present descriptive statistics 
for support. 54 Although few rigorous tests of profit 
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incentives have been made, most proposals for improving 
hospital efficiency emphasize the importance of profit 
incentives. For example, 'the Committee for Economic Devel-
opment has recommended a profit incentive in order to "pro-
vide a direct economic stake in successful and efficient 
operation of hospital services." 55 
The constrained sales maximization hypothesis suggests 
that nonproprietary hospitals diverge from the profit maxi-
mizing input-output combination for each intermediate ser-
vice only if they are confronted with substantially differ-
ent profit constraints. If a nonproprietary hospital 
attempts to maximize its surplus for facility expansion, 
then it behaves exactly like a profit maximizing proprie-
tary hospital. Similarly, if the management of a profit 
oriented hospital has goals other than profit maximization, 
constrained by a minimum profit requirement, then it would 
act like a nonproprietary hospital with a similar surplus 
requirement. 
If additional elements enter the administrator's 
utility function, a stronger probability of differences in 
technical efficiency emerges. Newhouse, Lee, and Ogur all 
point to the possibility of a pro-quality bias for non-
profit managers. 56 If nonproprietary managers are biased 
toward forms of return that induce excess capacity accumu-
lation, then their firms will be less technically effi-
cient. Ogur has depicted the effect in terms of complemen-
tary inputs. 57 Complementary inputs are defined as 
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anything, besides the manager himself, used to increase 
quantity or to demonstrate quality. Additional complemen-
tary inputs will initially increase profit by expanding 
demand and revenue more rapidly than cost. However, at 
some point complementary input additions must reduce 
profit. Although a profit maximizing hospital would cease 
input accumulation at point A in Figure 7, a nonprofit 
hospital is more likely to add status-producing inputs 
beyond point A, thereby reducing efficiency.5S 
The managerial constraint model assumes that there are 
systematic differences in the rules imposed on proprietary 
and nonproprietary hospitals. In proprietary hospitals 
owners are assigned exclusive, saleable rights to the value 
of net returns from production. The owners appoint a 
manager who chooses the set of production inputs in order 
to maximize owner return. To insure adherence to the 
profit objective, various rules and controls over mana-
gerial action could be imposed. 59 However, because it is 
costly to detect and eliminate all undesirable deviations, 
the trustees can make managerial reward a positive function 
of profit. Bonuses, stock options, profit sharing, and 
position security are all possible inducements to profit 
maximization. "Assigning some of the residual claim to the 
individual who manages the hospital thus provides an addi-
tional way to monitor his activities." 60 
For nonproprietary hospitals a different kind of mana-
gerial constraint is required. The nonprofit hospital 
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trustees cannot claim or assign the flow of net returns. 
'!'he absence of a connection between profit, firm objec-
tives, and managerial return reduces the effectiveness of 
the profit incentive as a monitoring device. Since perfor-
mance and managerial reward are not related to the current 
or future flow of net wealth, managers may seek other forms 
of return. To reduce potential abuses of managerial 
authority, trustees attempt to establish rules or guide-
lines governing specific managerial actions. 61 Even when 
explicit rules are established, performance may be diffi-
cult to measure. Therefore, managerial actions in non-
proprietary hospitals are not effectively constrained to be 
cost minimizing. Clarkson has found that managers in non-
proprietary hospitals are less concerned with input price 
information and more concerned with visible measures of 
quality than managers in profit oriented hospitals. 62 
Ogur has attempted to measure empirically the effect 
of profit orientation by testing the hypothesis that output 
per unit of input is lower in nonproprietary than in pro-
prietary hospitals. 63 To test the effect of profit incen-
tives, Ogur assumed that profit oriented hospitals combine 
resources to maximize profit. He found that the average 
product of labor was lower for nonproprietary than for pro-
prietary hospitals and concluded that nonproprietary hos-
pitals utilize resources less efficiently. 64 However, the 
conclusion is tentative because it fails to account for 
other structural differences in the hospitals tested. 
First, because other production inputs were not directly 
included, the lower average products for labor might 
reflect differences in input mixes, resource prices, or 
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technologies rather than efficiency. Second, Ogur points 
out that nonproprietary hospitals treat more severe cases 
which require more intensive care and more hospital 
services. 65 Even if resource utilization were equally 
efficient for both sets of hospitals, the use of patient 
days as the output measure would produce Ogur's result. 
Therefore, the evidence is consistent with, but cannot be· 
taken as proof of, the assertion that profit oriented hos-
pitals are systematically more efficient. 
Other studies have found similar results but with 
similar problems. Davis found that production costs in 
short-term general hospitals were lower in profit oriented 
hospitals over the 1961 to 1969 period. Profit oriented 
hospitals employed fewer personnel per patient day and had 
a lower ratio of plant assets to daily census than non-
profit hospitals. However, both ratios increased more 
rapidly over the period in proprietary hospitals. 66 
Wasyluka found that proprietary hospitals had fourteen per-
cent fewer employees per patient than nonprofit hospitals.67 
Since variations in absolute costs may be caused by differ-
ence in care intensity or case complexity, it is impossible 
to attribute them to differences in technical efficiency. 
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Service Range 
The third hypothesis states that "a broader service 
range reduces technical efficiency." Service range refers 
to the variety of specialized intermediate goods which a 
hospital can produce. Hospitals of a given bed or patient 
capacity may vary in the range of services offered as well 
as in the capacity for each type of service. Each inter-
mediate service is associated with a production function 
which specifies the relationship of specialized and non-
specialized inputs to the maximum possible rate of output. 
Therefore, the capacity for each hospital service depends 
on the set of resources chosen by the manager. Actual 
output, however, depends on patient referrals and physician 
decisions regarding the use of alternative therapies. 68 
As the range of services offered expands, the cost 
per unit of each individual service must increase, other 
things constant. For a given patient capacity, an expan-
sion of the service range increases the variety of cases 
that can be treated and the therapies available. As the 
variety of cases and treatment alternatives increase, the 
number of patients using each specific service tends to 
decline, and input per unit of output tends to increase. 
With respect to nuclear medicine, higher nuclear medicine 
output intensity might allow more efficient resource 
utilization if a narrower case mix does increase the 
probability of capacity use. 
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Although the hypothesis implies that service range has 
an independent effect on technical efficiency, service. 
range is often related to other elements of hospital struc-
ture. Just as input intensity for a particular type of 
output may be used to indicate quality, the range of ser-
vices available also demonstrates quality. Therefore, the 
structural conditions that create a pro-quality bias are 
expected to induce greater service range accumulation and 
reduced technical efficiency for each intermediate service. 
First, competition is thought to induce a broader service 
range. Competition for staff and patient referrals implies 
a return to little used capacity that strengthens the gen-
eral range of demand. 69 Therefore, given input capacity, 
nuclear medicine would be a smaller percentage of total 
output in more competitive hospitals. Second, nonprofit 
hospitals are assumed to acquire a broader service range 
and would be expected to exhibit a lower muclear medicine 
intensity (given capacity) than proprietary hospitals.7° 
The service range hypothesis requires investigation with 
respect to its collinearity with other elements of hospital 
structure and with respect to its independent effect on 
technical efficiency. 
Training 
The fourth hypothesis of the study states that "in-
house manpower training reduces technical efficiency." 
Since training is a joint product with medical service, it 
is commonly assumed that a training program must increase 
resource requirements without a corresponding increase in 
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output. The research hypothesis depends on two relation-
ships concerning training intensity and hospital structure. 
First, Lave, Lave, and Silverman have assumed that training 
is most intensive in status biased hospitals. 71 Because 
competitive and nonprofit hospitals tend to be status 
biased, they are more likely to have training programs if 
such programs contribute to status and managerial utility. 
In order to examine the independent effect of training on 
efficiency, these relationships must be tested empirically. 
The second relationship supposes that training reduces 
output efficiency. The actual relationship of training to 
efficiency depends on the definition of labor input and 
cost. Trainees produce medical outputs as a part of their 
training routine. Because their input represents the 
exhaustion of human resources with alternative potential 
uses, trainees represent part of the labor input in real 
terms. In a pecuniary sense, however, unpaid trainees may 
be treated as a free but productive resource. The actual 
cost imposed by training programs is not trainee-labor 
wages, but the cost of training equipment and teaching 
personnel. Areas requiring little direct trainee super-
vision may incur modest increases in labor.costs. Areas 
requiring substantial supervisory personnel will experience 
larger money costs of training. Moreover, if training pro-
grams require technical personnel with higher qualifications, 
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money costs will increase. The teaching cost is partially 
offset by the value of trainee output. The cost is also 
reduced to the extent that the training hospital retains 
its own trainees as employees. In this case the training 
cost could be treated (along with wages) as a cost of 
acquiring additional units of labor. Part of the cost 
would be recovered through the value of future production. 
Training intensive hospitals will exhibit lower medi-
cal outputs per unit of paid labor input to the extent that 
output reductions are not compensated by the value of 
present or future trainee production. The observed diver-
gence would, of course, increase if trainees were included 
in the input measure. 
Summary 
This chapter has reviewed selected writings that per-
tain to the hypotheses of the study. The structure of the 
hospital industry and the concept of technical production 
efficiency were reviewed. The focus on nuclear medicine 
as a specific hospital subindustry was analyzed as a tech-
nique for avoiding the homogeneity problem common to hos-
pital industry studies. Emphasis has been placed on the 
evaluation of the four structure-efficiency hypotheses 
within current theoretical models of the hospital industry. 
Available empirical evidence of the hypothesized relation-
ships has been reviewed. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
The analysis in Chapter II indicates that the market 
mechanism fails to promote technical efficiency in the 
hospital industry and in specific hospital subindustries. 
The primary source of the inefficiency is hypothesized to 
be the capacity accumulation bias created by four elements 
of firm structure. This chapter presents a methodology for 
investigating the relationship of competition, profit in-
centives, service range, and training intensity to relative 
efficiency in the production of nuclear medicine. 
A commonly applied device for estimating and comparing 
the relative efficiency of firms in a particular industry 
is an industry production function. 1 This chapter dis-
cusses the data source and methodology for constructing a 
set of nuclear medicine production functions for groups of 
hospitals operating under different structural circum-
stances. Specific methods for hospital grouping and 
hypothesis testing are developed. The interpretations of 
an estimated production function and its use in comparing 
relative efficiencies are reviewed. A technique for con-
structing a production frontier as an alternative test of 
relative firm efficiency is outlined. Finally, this 
51 
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chapter discusse,s criteria for the selection of a particu-
lar production function. 
Sources of Data 
Most of the data which are employed in this study are 
from the American College'of Radiology (ACR) and Energy 
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) Census of 
Nuclear Medicine. 2 The census format was developed during 
1973 and the data were collected and made available in 
1974.· Although the primary purpose of the census is to 
provide information for regional planning in nuclear medi-
cine, much of the data is applicable to the construction of 
a set of production functions. Questionnaires were sent to 
all of the 2,050 short-term general hospitals known to have 
a nuclear medicine facility. Of the questionnaire 
responses, 1,362 are usable for this study. The specific 
elements of data to be used are listed below: 
1. Hospital identification by American Hospital 
Association number. 
2. Hospital location by city, county, and state. 
3. Hospital bed capacity. 
4. Patient referral radius. 
5. Administrative control. 
6. Quantities of each nuclear medicine procedure 
performed. 
7. Kinds and quantities of nuclear medicine equipment 
owned. 
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8. Numbers of part-time and full-time nuclear medi-
cine personnel. 
9. Number of trainees. 
10. Personnel education and training information. 
In addition to the data provided by the ACR-ERDA census, 
the following data are also available: 
1. Service price data for each nuclear medicine pro-
cedure is available on a statewide basis from the 
"Professional Service Index" of Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Plans. 
2. Capital equipment price data are available from 
six manufacturers of nuclear medicine equipment. 
The Production Function 
The primary empirical construct for this research is 
the estimation of a set of production functions for nuclear 
medicine. A microeconomic production function is a tech-
nical relationship which describes the maximum rate of out-
put that can be produced from various rates of resource 
utilization.) This definition suggests that production is 
a physical process in which inputs are transformed into 
outputs. The production function is not limited to a 
single producxion technology but includes the range of 
input-output combinations for conceivable methods of pro-
duction. In this context the production function sets the 
highest limit on the output which a firm can hope to obtain 
with a certain combination of resource inputs during the 
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production period at the given state of technical knowl-
edge. Given the technical possibilities that are set up by 
the production function, the choice of a production method 
is a matter of other economic considerations, such as rela-
tive resource prices. 4 As demonstrated in Chapter II, 
maximum technical efficiency requires operation on the 
production function for the chosen rates of resource input. 
A commonly used empirical form of the production func-
tion is the Cobb-Douglas specification, 
( 5) 
where Q is output per unit time, L and K are the respective 
labor and capital inputs per unit time, and A, a , and S are 
the parametric constants to be estimated. a and a are the 
"input elasticities", which describe the relationship of 
the respective labor and capital inputs to the rate of out-
put. A is the "scale parameter" which shows the relative 
height of the production surface and indicates the state 
of technical knowledge. 5 By specifying Equation (5) in 
logarithmic form and by using empirical data for labor, 
capital, and output, a least squares regression program can 
be used to estimate the parameters of a nuclear medicine 
production function. 
ln Q = ln A + a ln L + S ln K ( 6) 
The a and S represent the slope terms and ln A represents 
the intercept term. 
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The empirical form of the estimated production func-
tion does not correspond perfectly to the theoretical defi-
nition. Because the multiple linear regression technique 
minimizes the sum of squared deviations of actual from pre-
dicted firm outputs, some observed output levels will lie 
above the estimated production function. However, the true 
production function requires that all outputs must lie on 
or below the production surface. An output level above the 
function would define a new state of the arts in produc-
tion. Instead of the precise theoretical definition, some 
economists have suggested that "the estimated production 
function represents the average production surface for the 
industry." 6 
The concept of an average production surface has 
generated several interpretations. One possible explana-
tion is that the estimated function represents an average 
industry technology. This view assumes that firms face 
different physical production constraints. Another expla-
' nation assumes that the average production function shows 
the maximum sustainable output rate over some time period. 
Production divergences above the sustainable output would 
reflect random and uncontrolled production shocks. Because 
such shocks cannot be controlled or predicted, they cannot 
be treated as production inputs. Aigner and Chu refer to 
"random fluctuations due to 'lucky' coincidences of good 
weather, sunspots, etc." 7 Devoid of the random distur-
bances, no divergences above the production function would 
be observed. 
A third explanation, used by Aigner and Chu, provides 
an important application of the estimated production func-
tion to this study. 
From a more practical standpoint, if, for instance, 
we wish to estimate how much output on the average 
could be obtained from a firm in the industry with 
a certain set of inputs, then the average con§ept 
would obviously be the correct one to employ. 
Significant differences in production surface parameters 
would reflect differences in expected average output from 
a given input combination. Such differences in expected 
average output would imply differences in technical 
efficiency. 
This interpretation suggests that an estimated produc-
tion function could be used as a measure of relative effi-
ciency in the production of nuclear medicine. The firms 
in the hospital industry can be divided into segments based 
on the four structural elements to be examined, and an 
average production surface can be estimated for each seg-
ment. A comparison of the estimated parameters would pro-
vide a test of relative efficiency. To apply such a tech-
nique to the four hypotheses of the study requires two 
sets of specifications. First, an appropriate method of 
segmenting the industry in accordance with each hypothesis 
is required. Second, labor, capital, and output for each 
firm must be specified from the available data in a suit-
able form for estimation in Equation (6). 
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Test Groupings and Parameter Comparisons 
The test of each hypothesis is performed independently. 
Each test requires a division of the industry into data 
subsets based on the structural element under observation. 
To test the hypothesis "increased competitive intensity 
reduces technical efficiency," a measure of hospital compe-
tition is required. The most commonly used measures of 
competition and concentration are market share proportions 
and concentration ratios. Unfortunately, such measures are 
difficult to obtain for the hospital industry because there 
are a large number of separate geographic markets. Although 
a few hospitals draw patient referrals on a national basis 
for a few specialized services, most hospitals have a 
patient referral radius limited by feasible physician and 
patient transportation distances. 9 
For the hospital industry, then, measures besides con-
centration are related to firm competition. First, there 
is the size of the geographic area from which the hospital 
draws patients, measured as the patient referral radius. 
Other things constant, a larger patient referral radius 
increases the number of hospitals with which the firm con-
ceives itself to be in competition.10 Second, the density 
of hospitals within the geographic area effects competition. 
by altering the number of alternatives available. Third, 
the density of population within the market area is likely 
to be associated with the total volume of hospital 
production and the intensity of competition. The index of 
competitive intensity, CI, will be: 
CI = ( referral radius ) x ( hospital density ) x ( population 
density ) • 
Such an index might be inadequate if the purpose were to 
construct a precise continuum of competitive intensity. 
However, as the purpose is to segment firms into aggregate 
categories, the procedure is less prone to serious distor-
tions. On the basis of the competition index, hospitals 
will be divided into three groups, and an average produc-
tion surface will be estimated for each group. The theo-
retical analysis anticipates lower production surface 
parameters as competition increases. 
To test the hypothesis "a lack of profit incentive 
reduces technical efficiency," firms will be divided into 
three categories. These are proprietary hospitals, private 
nonprofit hospitals, and government hospitals. Production 
surface parameters will be estimated for each group. On a 
theoretical basis lower parameters are expected for the 
nonprofit groups. 
A priori reasoning suggests that the elements of ser-
vice range and in-house manpower training are systemati-
cally related to competitive intensity and profit incen-
tives. Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested 
before the structural categories are defined: 
1. High competitive hospitals have greater average 
service ranges than low competitive hospitals. 
2. Nonprofit hospitals have greater average service 
ranges than proprietary hospitals. 
3. High competitive hospitals have higher average 
training levels than low competitive hospitals. 
4. Nonprofit hospitals have higher average training 
levels than proprietary hospitals. 
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The appropriate t-statistic for comparing mean values taken 
f d b . 11 rom two ata su sets ~s: 
t = 
(ul - u2) - (Ul - U2) 
2 2 1 ( s1 + s 2)2 , 
where u1 - u2 = 0. The sample means for the data subsets 
are u1 and u2• The true means are u1 and u2, respectively, 
and the standard errors of the sample means are s1 and s2 ,, 
respectively. Adjustments for competition and profit 
orientation are based on these test results and precede an 
examination of the structure-efficiency hypotheses. 
To test the hypothesis that "a broader service range 
reduces technical efficiency," a method of approximating 
the variety of services offered by individual hospitals is 
required. A uniform measure for service range is not 
available in a consistent form. Instead, service range is 
approximated by the intensity of nuclear medicine produc-
tion. Given a hospital bed capacity and a capacity for a 
single specialized service, Lee and Wallace argue that a 
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broader service range would reduce the share of total out-
d d b h . 1 . 12 put pro uce y t e s~ng e serv~ce. Similarly, a broader 
service range would reduce the utilization of a given 
nuclear medicine capacity since fewer beds would be occu-
pied by patients using nuclear medicine outputs. Nuclear 
medicine production intensity can be measured as the ratio 
of nuclear medicine output to total bed capacity, and hos-
pitals can be divided into groups for testing. The ex-
pected theoretical result is lower production surface para-
meters for lower nuclear medicine intensity hospitals (i.e. 
those with a broader service range). 
To test the hypothesis ''in-house manpower training 
reduces te~hnical efficiency," hospitals will be grouped on 
the basis of their relative training program sizes. Either 
a relative or an absolute training level measure could be 
used. The relative measure is preferred since the effect 
of an additional trainee would depend on the size of the 
nuclear medicine unit. Relative training level is measured 
as the ratio of trainees to full-time nuclear medicine 
personnel. High training level hospitals are expected to 
exhibit lower production surface parameters. 
The four hypotheses of the research are examined 
separately. For each hypothesis test the hospital popula-
tion is divided into subsets on the basis of the struc-
tural classifications developed above. Then, a production 
surface of the form in Equation (6) is derived for each 
data subset. If the estimated coefficients are 
significantly different, then a relationship between the 
particular structural element and technical efficiency is 
implied. 13 
Two statistical tests can be applied to compare the 
coefficients associated with different subsets. First, 
the Chow Test provides a test of different estimations of 
the same regression model. The Chow Test is based on a 
comparison of the sum of the squared residual terms for 
pooled data and for separate data subsets. If the pooled 
data coefficients fit each of the individual subsets 
(within error), then no additional explanatory power is 
gained from the subset division. The appropriate F-
statistic for the Chow Test is: 14 
(Qp - Ql + Q2) : K 
F(K, T1 + T2 - 2K) = ------------(Ql + Q2) ~ (Tl + T2 - 2K) , 
where K is the number of parameters in the regression 
model, and Qp' Q1, and Q2 are the sums of squared residuals 
for pooled data, the first subset, and the second subset, 
respectively. T1 and T2 are the number of observations in 
the respective subsets. 
Although the Chow Test provides an overall indicator 
of the similarity of differences among subset coefficients, 
it does not directly examine the individual model para-
meters, ln A, &, and ~ • A second test can be applied to 
compare corresponding parameters from different data 
subsets. The test statistic for comparing an individual 
model parameter from two separate estimations (e.g. ) is: 
t = 
, 
where a 1 - a 2 = o. a 1 and a 2 are the actuals values 
of the parameter for the two data subsets. a 1 and a 2 
are the corresponding predicted values, and s1 and s2 are 
the standard deviations for the respective subset coeffi-
cients.15 If the calculated t-statistic exceeds the tabu-
lated value corresponding to a selected significance level, 
then a difference in input-output relationships among the 
subsets is identified. 
The Data Format 
The production function form in Equation (6) requires 
data for L, K, and Q. The primary labor input for the 
nuclear medicine industry is the nuclear medical technolo-
gist. The nonphysician labor input for each hospital is 
measured as the sum of full-time nuclear medicine person-
nel plus one half the sum of part-time nuclear medicine 
personnel, as measured by the ACR-ERDA census. For each 
hospital the capital input is measured as the summed quan-
tities of each type of nuclear medicine equipment, 
weighted by the current market prices for equipment in-
puts. This is described by 
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K = L: 
i=l 
k.R. l. l. 
, 
where K is the hospital capital stock, ki is the number of 
units of the ith type of equipment, and Ri is the current 
dollar price of the ith type of equipment. Therefore, the 
capital input is measured in dollars. 
The nuclear medicine industry output consists of 
fifty-eight diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. The 
total output of each hospital is measured as the quantity 
of each procedure, weighted by an index price for each 
procedure. This is represented by 
5S 
L: 
i=l 
P.Q .. 
l. l.J 
, 
where Qj is the total nuclear medicine output for the jth 
hospital, Pi is the index price for the ith procedure, and 
Q .. is the number of procedures in the ith category per-l.J 
formed by jth hospital. The index price for each procedure 
is measured from state level price data as the weighted 
average price of the output. This is shown by 
, 
th where m is them state, P. is the state level price for l.m 
the ith output, and Qim is the total state quantity of the 
ith output. 16 
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The Production Frontier 
Although the average production surfaces provide a 
basis for comparing relative technical efficiencies, it is 
not clear that an average production surface is the best 
efficiency benchmark. The true production function may not 
be a neutral transformation of the estimated average func-
tion. Substantial divergences of true and estimated input 
elasticities would reduce the validity of efficiency com-
parisons based on the average production surfaces. 1: The 
estimated function, in such a case, misspecifies the actual 
shape of the production surface. A second method for com-
paring relative firm efficiency under the four hypotheses 
of the study utilizes an estimation of a nuclear medicine 
production frontier. The production frontier better 
represents the theoretical concept of a production function 
because all observed firm outputs are constrained to lie on 
or below the surface. Since the uncontrolled production 
factors (e.g. weather) are likely to be insignificant to 
nuclear medicine production, serious random shocks are 
unlikely. Therefore, a production frontier conceptually 
exists showing the maximum output for each possible set of 
inputs. 
A nuclear medicine production function can be esti-
mated with linear programming techniques by constraining 
all firm outputs to lie on or below the frontier. The 
linear programming method takes the highest observed output 
value for each input combination as the standard for that 
input set. Parameter estimates result in a production sur-
face on which the set of one hundred percent efficient 
firms would lie. The estimation of such a "deterministic 
frontier" has become relatively common in empirical produc-
. t d" 18 t~on s u ~es. 
For convenience in developing the linear programming 
format, the following matrices and vectors are defined: 19 
1 lnL1 lnK1 
• • • 
• • • A= 1 lnLi lnKi 
• • • 
• • • 1 lnLn lnKn 
1362 X 3 
lnQ1 
• 
• b= lnQi 
• 
• 
lnQn 
1362 X 1 
1 
c = Iiit 
IiiK 
3 X 1 
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"' lnA 
X "' = a
A 
a 
3 X 1 
e1 
• 
• 
e = e. ~ 
• 
• 
en 
1362 X 1 
1 
• 
v = • 
• 1 
n X 1 
where Li, Ki, and Qi are labor input, capital input, and 
output, respectively, for the ith hospital. The industry 
average values for the logarithm of labor, capital, and 
output are !'iii:, InK, and lnQ. The estimated values of the 
production function parameters are A, a, and s. For a 
given set of estimated parameters, the residual terms for 
each hospital form the e vector. The v vector is a "sum 
vector" as described by Hadley, to be used for finding the 
f h 1 t . 'f' 20 sum o t e e emen s ~n any spec~ ~c vector. 
To estimate the Cobb-Douglas production function in 
Equation (5), all divergences from the estimated surface 
67 
can be forced to lie below the production function, such 
that 
Ax >b. ( 7) 
Because an infinite set of estimated parameters would 
satisfy the inequality in Equation (7), the production sur-
face must be forced to lie as closely as possible to the 
set of observed points. To be most consistent with the 
multiple linear regression format, the model could be 
specified to minimize the sum of the squared residual 
terms. Hence, the problem is to minimize e'e, subject to 
. Equation (7). However, a quadratic objective function 
places an emphasis on the extreme observation values. 
Since the linear programming technique already focuses on 
extreme observations, this objective function is undesir-
able. Instead, Aigner and Chu suggest the minimization of 
the sum of the residual terms. Timmer points out that 
"minimizing the linear sum of the divergence terms avoids 
the additional weighting of extreme observations." 21 By 
constraining each residual term to be non-negative, 
Equation (7) becomes, 
Ax - e = b. 
The estimation technique then, is to minimize e•v, 
subject to Ax _: b, 
and subject to X > 0. 
To apply the available linear programming package, the sum 
of the residual terms must be expressed as a function of 
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lnA,a, S, L, and K. This can be done as: 
e'v = (Ax)•v- b'v ( 9) 
For any given set of data, b'v must be a constant and can 
be dropped from Equation (9) without consequence. Since 
(Ax)'v represents the total of the predicted logarithm of 
output values for all firms, it can be shown that, 
( Ax) ' v = ( c ' x) n, ( 10) 
where n is a scalar equal to the number of firms in the 
data universe. Therefore, 
e'v = (c'x)n ( 11) 
Equation (11) provides an expression for e'v that is suit-
able as a linear programming objective function. For com-
putational purposes it is desirable to divide Equation (11) 
by the number of observations in the sample. 22 The model 
for the estimation of lnA, a, and S is: 
Minimize 
c'x 
subject to Ax> b 
and subject to X > 0. 
The estimated production function parameters describe a 
production surface consistent in the theoretical definition 
requiring maximum output per unit of input. 
Estimating a Probabilistic Frontier 
The linear programming technique is of value because 
it provides an alternative estimate of the true production 
function. However, the technique is subject to two prob-
lems of particular importance. First, if there are no 
firms in the industry that are actually achieving technical 
efficiency; then even the deterministic frontier will not 
represent the true production function. The problem, how-
ever, does not invalidate the methodology for this research 
since the frontier is to be used as an efficiency datum of 
the correct shape. Essentially, the most efficient firms 
are defined as one hundred percent efficient. 
The shape of the estimated production frontier is a 
more serious concern. The procedure takes set of highest 
output values for each resourc·e combination as the stan-
dard. Strange results could occur if a few hospitals 
exhibit unusually high output rates that are not sustain-
able, or if errors in data reporting have occurred. The 
problem is complicated by the fact that the linear program-
ming procedure provides no goodness-of-fit measures for the 
estimated parameters. These limitations lead to the second 
problem, the possibility of_ a significant error in the 
estimated input elasticities. If the input elasticities 
are incorrectly estimated, the shape of the production 
frontier will not correspond to the actual shape. Timmer 
states, "Because only extreme observations are used, the 
70 
estimation is subject to errors."23 Since no check on the 
adequacy of the estimates is provided through goodness-of-
fit statistics, serious estimation errors might not be 
obvious from the parameter calculation alone. If the esti-
mated surface shape is not a reliable estimator of the true 
production function, then the technique fails to provide an 
appropriate efficiency datum. 
To reduce the likelihood of allowing extreme observa-
tions to distort the estimated frontier, Timmer has added 
an additional step in the linear programming procedure. 
"To avoid the problem of spurious errors in extreme obser-
vations, it is desirable to fit a probabilistic fron-
tier."24 This can be done by translating Equation (5) into 
a probability statement of the form 
Pr (ALq,K~ Q.)> P, l. l. l. 
where P is an externally specified probability. For the 
deterministic frontier, P is equal to one. Aigner and Chu 
have also referred to such a device. "One may pursue less 
than one hundred percent efficient frontiers using chance 
constraint programming ideas ••• with a sp~cified proba-
bility constraint which is to hold." 25 By throwing out 
the most efficient firms, the chance of serious distortions 
of the production surface shape is reduced. 
There may be no way to judge the appropriate proba-
bility level to be specified for the given data set. An 
arbitrary value for P could, of course, be chosen. As an 
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alternative to the arbitrary selection of P, Timmer has 
utilized a gradual reduction of P in small increments until 
the estimated parameters stabilize. The technique discards 
the most efficient observations slowly until those creating 
the apparent distortion are eliminated. Timmer argues that 
once the parameters have stabilized, "it is likely that the 
estimation errors created by the focus on extreme observa-
tions have been largely overcome." 26 
A Test of Relative Efficiency 
Unlike the multiple linear regression format, the 
linear programming technique does not imply an average 
input-output relationship. Since no hospital output can 
exist above the production frontier, it can be used as an 
efficiency datum. Relative firm efficiency can be evalu-
ated as the percentage divergence from the production 
frontier. The index of efficiency divergence is measured 
by 
For a one hundred percent efficient firm, the index would 
be zero. As the divergence from the frontier function 
increases, the index of efficiency divergence will in-
crease. For the set of nuclear medicine producers, the 
observed efficiency divergences can be regressed on the 
four structural elements of concern: Competitive inten-
sity, profit incentive, service range, and training level. 
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where: D = efficiency divergence index 
CI = competitive intensity index 
NMI = nuclear medicine intensity index 
TR = relative training level 
G = a dummy variable for government hospitals 
p 
= a dummy variable for proprietary hospitals 
Selection of a Production Function 
The Cobb-Douglas form of the production function has 
been used for this study for two primary reasons. First, 
the estimation format allows the use of physical data for 
inputs and outputs. Because the use of actual input-output 
data does not require the assumption of cost minimization, 
it is not necessary to suppose that firms acquire resources 
on the basis of factor prices. Since it is not clear that 
hospitals act to minimize production costs, the avoidance 
of such a constraint is desirable. Moreover, physical· 
input and output data are available for individual hos-
pitals. Before the data could be used to estimate a pro-
duction function form requiring factor price data, state-
wide aggregates would be required. This would be particu-
larly undesirable for a study focusing on the efficiency 
and structure relationships for individual firms, and would 
reduce the advantage to be gained from the availability of 
individual firm data. 
Second, the Cobb-Douglas function does not require 
that the input elasticities must sum to unity. If the 
industry is characterized by increasing or decreasing 
returns to scale over the relevant range of output, then 
production function formats restricting the input elas-
ticity values would be less desirable. 
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The most important criterion for choosing a production 
function is the true form of the input-output relationship. 
However, there is no a priori basis for selecting the most 
suitable description of nuclear medicine production. The 
empirical validity of the Cobb-Douglas form for the nuclear 
medicine industry is examined in Chapter IV. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented the sources of data and an 
estimation technique for constructing a set of nuclear 
medicine production surfaces. Use of the average produc-
tion surface was examined as an efficiency comparison 
device. Frameworks for firm grouping and hypothesis test-
ing and for the estimation of a nuclear medicine production 
frontiers as an alternative efficiency datum were devel-
oped. Problems and criteria involved in selection of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function were discussed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the 
four hypotheses pertaining to hospital structure and tech-
nical efficiency in the production of nuclear medicine. 
The analysis includes a comparison of the theoretical 
expectations already developed with results obtained from 
empirical statistical models. 
The first section of the chapter examines the signifi-
cance of differences in average production surface para-
meters for each structural segment of the nuclear medicine 
industry. These were estimated using the multiple linear 
regression technique. The second section of the chapter 
presents the linear programming estimate of the nuclear 
medicine production frontier and examines the relationships 
of hospital structure to technical efficiency divergence. 
The third section of the chapter compares qualitative 
differences in resources among structural groups. The 
fourth section of the chapter examines specific problems 
of production function estimation. 
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Average Production Function Results 
Competition 
A theoretical examination of the hypothesis, "In-
creased competitive intensity reduces technical effi-
ciency," anticipates lower production surface parameters 
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for competitive hospitals due to over-accumulation of pro-
duction inputs. The empirical validity of the hypothesis 
can be examined from the three sets of production surface 
parameters listed in Table I. The R2 values for the 
regression equations are .$5, .ee, and .90, indicating 
that all but ten percent to fifteen percent of output 
variations are explained on the basis of input capacity. 
Frequently, fitted production functions explain as 
much as ninety-seven to ninety-nine percent of output 
. t" 1 var1a 1ons. Compared to these results, the estimated 
nuclear medicine production surfaces provide a relatively 
poor data fit. However, an optimal fit requires that "no 
significant management biases exist to affect technical 
efficiency." 2 In this case the fit is Very good since the 
only structural element for which adjustment was made is 
competitive intensity. If other structural differences 
also affect output efficiency, then a perfect fit would be 
impossible from input data alone. The estimates for the 
nuclear medicine industry provide a better fit than most 
production function estimates for the hospital industry.3 
The Chow Test F-statistic, 365.7, is statistically 
VAR 
ln L 
ln K 
ln A 
ln L 
ln K 
ln A 
ln L 
ln K 
ln A 
MEAN 
1.04 
1.56 
TABLE I 
PRODUCTION SURFACE PARAMETERS 
REG COEFF 
Low Com;eetitive 
.69 
.47 
2.78 
STD ERROR PROP VAR 
REG COEFF INCREMENT 
Intensitx:1 R2: .88 
.020 .55 
.016 .33 
.048 
Middle Com;eetitive Intensiti1 R2: .84 
1.14 .70 .018 .68 
1.80 .39 .016 .15 
2.60 .049 
High Com;eetitive Intensitx:1 R2: .90 
1.67 .70 .034 .81 
2.50 .36 .033 .09 
2.41 .052 
t-STAT 
31.4 
27.8 
37.7 
22.8 
21.4 
10.8 
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significant at the .0001 level. Therefore, it appears 
that the amount of variation explained by the pooled data 
is much smaller than the combined amount from the three 
separate estimations. 
In each of the equations, the scale parameter and in-
put elasticity terms are statistically significant. As 
expected on an a priori basis, the scale parameter is sig-
nificantly higher for less competitive hospitals. This 
result holds for a comparison of any two of the groups at 
the .01 significance level. In other words, the produc-
tion surface for a less competitive hospital would lie 
above the surface for a more competitive hospital. For 
any set of resource prices, the production surfaces can be 
translated into cost functions. The average cost function 
would appear to shift down as competitive intensity is 
reduced. Figure 8 illustrates the relative shapes of 
average cost fun9tions corresponding to the three produc-
tion surfaces. 
The estimated input elasticities provide further com-
parisons of technical efficiency. Summed input elastici-
ties are 1.16, 1.09, and 1.06, respectively, for low, 
middle, and high competitive intensity hospitals. 
Although slight economies of scale appear in each estimate, 
the degree of scale economies declines as competition in-
creases. In terms of the average cost curves in Figure 8, 
a reduction in competition increases the negative steepness 
of the function. This result supports the conclusion that 
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by Competitive Intensity 
a unit of input is more productive when applied in a less 
competitive hospital. A possible interpretation of the 
result, suggested by the theoretical analysis, is that non-
competitive hospitals acquire inputs to meet expected 
demands for output. Competitive pressures create incen-
tives not directly related to demand, thereby causing input 
redundancies and reduced technical efficiency. 
The most significant difference in resource input 
elasticities appears for the capital input. The capital 
input elasticity of the low competitive group exceeds those 
of the higher competitive groups at the .001 statistical 
significance level. The difference in capital input elas-
ticities between the middle and high competitive groups is 
not statistically significant at the .1 level. The labor 
input elasticities are not significant at the .1 level but 
are slightly higher for more competitive hospital groups. 
These results imply that most of the over-accumulation of 
resources is in equipment rather than in personnel inputs. 
If more competitive hospitals do acquire excess equipment, 
then increases in the capital stock would add less to total 
output in these hospitals. However, the excess supply of 
capital would allow an additional unit of labor to be more 
productive, hence, the higher labor input elasticity in 
more competitive hospitals. 
In the same vein Table I shows the proportion of out-
put variation which is explained by each input. In the 
more competitive hospitals the capital input adds much less 
to the predictive power of the equatio~ than in the low 
competitive hospital group. Variations in capital inputs 
account for only nine percent and fifteen percent of output 
variations in the high and middle competitive intensity 
groups. In the low competitive group the capital input 
explains thirty-three percent of output variations. This 
result is expected if competitive hospitals are thought to 
acquire excess equipment irrespective of use. 
Overall, the evidence from the set of average produc-
tion surfaces is consistent with, and provides empirical 
• 
support of, the theoretical expectation of reduced effi-
ciency in more competitive hospitals. The over-accumulation 
of capacity seems to be concentrated in the capital input. 
Profit Orientation 
The hypothesis, "Profit incentives increase technical 
efficiency", is examined from the three sets of production 
surface parameters listed in Table II. The regression R2 
values range from .81 to .90. The poorer data fit for 
private nonprofit hospitals is partly due to differences in 
competitive intensities among the three groups. The aver-
age competitive intensities are not significantly different 
for the three groups. However, there is a greater disper-
sion of competitive intensities for private nonprofit 
hospitals. Table III reports the average competitive 
intensities and their standard deviations. 
Since competition appears to affect technical 
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TABLE II 
PRODUCTION SURFACE PARAMETERS 
REG COEFF STD ERROR PROP VAR 
REG COEFF INCREMENT 
ProErietarz HosEitals1 R2: .$6 
.5$ .052 .33 
.66 .040 .53 
).11 .054 
Private Non-Profit HosEitals1 R2: .$1 
1.11 .72 .017 .64 
1.70 .41 .014 .17 
2.71 .046 
Government HosEitals1 R2: .90 
1.23 .67 .017 .76 
1.$$ 
.33 .014 .14 
2.64 .049 
t-STAT 
11.1 
16.2 
42.4 
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39.$ 
24.1 
TABLE III 
AVERAGE COMPETITIVE INTENSITIES 
Administrative Average Competitive Standard 
Orientation Intensity Deviation 
Proprietary 125 60 
Private Non-profit 166 158 
Government 155 68 
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efficiency, the larger variation in competition would cause 
a poorer data fit. The poorer data fit associated with 
greater variation in competitive intensity is evidence of 
the importance of competitive intensity to technical effi-
ciency. 
The Chow Test F-statistic for the three data subsets 
' is 439.6 and indicates that the division of data on the 
basis of profit orientation provides a much better fit than 
can be obtained from pooled data. In each of the equations, 
the scale parameters and input elasticities are highly 
significant. The scale parameter is nearly twenty percent 
larger for proprietary hospitals than for either of the 
nonprofit groups. The difference in the nonprofit private 
and government group scale parameters is not statistically 
significant at the .1 level. The summed input elasticities 
are 1.24, 1.13, and 1.00 for proprietary, private nonprofit, 
and government hospitals, respectively. Economies of scale 
appear in both private groups, and constant returns to 
scale appear for the government group. The cost curve 
shapes associated with the production surfaces are in 
Figure 9. These results are consistent with the theoreti-
cal expectation of greater technical efficiency in profit 
oriented hospitals. The proprietary hospital production 
surface lies above the nonprofit surfaces, and the degree 
of divergence increases with higher output. 
The labor input elasticity is significantly higher for 
the private nonprofit group at the .001 statistical signif-
icance level when compared with either of the other groups. 
The labor input elasticity is higher in government than in 
proprietary hospitals at the .01 significance level. The 
term accounts for sixty-four percent of output variations 
in the private nonprofit group and for seventy-six percent 
of output variations in the government group. It accounts 
for only thirty-three percent of output variations in the 
proprietary hospital group. 
The results are reversed for the capital input. The 
capital input elasticity is greater for proprietary hos-
pitals than for either nonprofit group at the .001 statis-
tical significance level. It is also greater in the pri-
vate nonprofit group than in the government group at the 
.01 significance level. Variations in capital inputs 
explain only fourteen and sixteen percent of output differ-
ences in private nonprofit and government hospitals, 
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Orientation 
respectively. In the proprietary group the capital input 
accounts for fifty-two percent of output differences. 
These results imply that nonprofit hospitals acquire 
capital resource inputs irrespective of actual utilization, 
and then acquire labor resource inputs as capacity is 
actually used. As a result, labor input appears to be a 
very good predictor of output. The lower labor produc-
tivity in proprietary hospitals suggests that these hos-
pitals economize on capital inputs by using labor intensive 
production techniques. Less capital investment would allow 
more short-run flexibility and less excess capacity. The 
results support the hypothesis concerning profit incentives 
and efficiency and imply that excess capital accumulation 
is a primary source of technical inefficiency in nonprofit 
hospitals. 
Service Range 
Competition and profit incentives have been hypothe-
sized to affect both the intensity of input accumulation 
for specific services and the range of services offered. 
The hypothesis, "a broader service range reduces technical 
efficiency,",is concerned with the independent effect of 
the breadth of service offerings on technical efficiency. 
Two empirical problems of the hypothesis test were dis-
cussed in Chapter III. First, service range is difficult 
to measure, and must be approximated as the intensity of 
nuclear medicine production. Second, hospitals that have 
a status bias (particularly competitive and nonprofit hos-
pitals) may tend to acquire broader service ranges. To 
test for the independent effect of service range, it is 
necessary to adjust for these managerial biases. 
The t-statistic to be used for comparing the mean 
values taken from two samples was defined in Chapter III. 
The universe of nuclear medicine producers was divided 
separately on the basis of competitive intensity and profit 
orientation, and an average nuclear medicine intensity was 
computed for each data subset. Finally, the corresponding 
subsets were tested for differences in average nuclear 
medicine intensities. 
The division of data on the basis of competitive 
intensity produced a computed t-statistic of 1.99, indi-
cating that there is a significant difference in nuclear 
medicine intensity in competitive and noncompetitive hos-
pitals. The t-statistic for the division based on profit 
orientation was .96, and is not significant at the .1 
level. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust for competi-
tive intensity but not for profit orientation. 
Since competitive hospitals have systematically lower 
nuclear medicine intensities (indicating broader service 
range), two separate groups are examined. One group com-
pares the effec't of nuclear medicine intensity in low com-
petitive hospitals. The other group compares the same 
effect among high competitive hospitals. Table IV shows 
the estimated production coefficients for low and high 
VAR 
ln L 
ln K 
ln A 
ln L 
ln K 
ln A 
ln L 
ln K 
ln A 
TABLE IV 
PRODUCTION SURFACE PARAMETERS 
MEAN REG COEFF STD ERROR 
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PROP VAR 
INCREMENT 
Low Competitive Hospitals 
Low Nuclear Medicine Intensit~ 1 R2: .S3 
1.1S .71 .03S .59 
1.S3 .54 .030 .24 
2.65 .050 
High Nuclear Medicine Intensit~ 1 R2: .S1 
.91 .67 .024 .52 
1.43 .44 .021 .21 
2.S7 .052 
High Competitive Hospitals 
Low Nuclear Medicine Intensit~ 1 R2: .e2 
1.43 .70 .025 .S2 
2.24 .34 .025 .oe 
2.67 .047 
t-STAT 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
REG COEFF STD ERROR 
REG COEFF 
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INCREMENT 
High Nuclear Medicine Intensity, R2: .82 
ln L 1.13 
ln K 1.75 
ln A 
.68 
.34 
2.62 
.022 
.019 
.055 
.66 
.16 
90 
t-STAT 
31.1 
18.6 
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nuclear medicine intensive producers after adjusting for 
competitive intensity. 
In each equation all of the regression coefficients 
are highly significant. The R2 values range from .82 to 
.91. The Chow Test F-statistic for the low competitive 
subsets is 3.9 and is statistically significant at the .01 
level. The F-statistic for the high competitive subsets is 
2.0 and is not statistically significant at the .1 level. 
Although dividing the low competitive group on the basis of 
nuclear medicine intensity adds to the explanatory power of 
the equation, there is no additional explanatory power 
gained by dividing the high competitive group. 
For the low competitive hospitals the high nuclear 
medicine intensity group has a significantly higher scale 
parameter. However, the scale parameters are not signifi-
cantly different for the high competitive subsets. It has 
already been observed that competitive hospitals acquire 
more excess capacity. That observation, coupled with these 
results, implies that service range has very little impact 
on efficiency when other status biases exist. On the other 
hand, service range does appear to have an impact when 
hospitals are not capacity biased. 
For the group of low competitive hospitals, the high 
nuclear medicine intensity subset has lower input elastici-
ties for both labor and capital. Therefore, as output 
expands the production surfaces for the high and low 
nuclear medicine intensity, subsets appear to converge. 
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The average cost curves corresponding to these production 
surfaces are shown in Figure 10. It should be noted that 
the high nuclear medicine intensity production surface is 
higher over the entire relevant range of output. None of 
the hospitals in the data universe used an input combina-
tion that would show a higher predicted output rate on the 
low nuclear medicine intensity function. 
For the high competitive hospital subsets the input 
elasticities were not significantly different for either 
resource. It appears that service range has little effi-
ciency impact in these hospitals. The cost curves corre-
sponding to the high competitive intensity data subsets are 
in Figure 11. 
Overall, these results indicate that the importance of 
service range to technical efficiency depends, first, on 
the existence of other capacity accumulation incentives, 
and, second, on the absolute volume of o~tput. As other 
capacity biases are reduced, service range appears to be of 
greater significance to technical efficiency. Moreover, a 
broader service range hospital can add a nuclear medicine 
facility with less efficiency loss if it expects to produce 
a relatively large volume of output. 
Training 
To test the hypothesis, "In-house manpower training 
reduces technical efficiency," the proprietary hospitals 
were deleted from the data universe. Only five of the 
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Figure 10. Long Run Average Cost for Low 
Competitive Hospitals 
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seventy-three proprietary hospitals reported training of 
technical personnel. Since proprietary hospitals were 
found to be more efficient, their inclusion in the analysis 
would give an effici~ncy bias to nontraining hospitals. 
The five proprietary hospitals that do produce training do 
not constitute a sufficient sample for estimation of a 
separate production surface. 
To avoid the inclusion of other managerial biases in 
the hypothesis test, data subsets were separated on the 
basis of competition and administrative orientation. The 
average training level was computed for each subset. The 
computed t-statistic for comparing average training levels 
in competitive and noncompetitive hospitals was .37. 
Therefore, an adjustment for competitive intensity is not 
required. The t-statistic for comparing average training 
levels in private nonprofit and government hospitals was 
2.3, indicating that the average training level is signifi-
cantly higher in private nonprofit hospitals. The test of 
the effect of training intensity on efficiency was made 
after adjusting for administrative orientation. 
Table V lists the parameter estimates for each of the 
production surfaces. The R2 values are from .e1 to .92. 
The adjustment for training intensity did little to improve 
the predictive power of the regression equations for either 
the government or private nonprofit group. The Chow Test 
supports this observation. The F-statistics for the 
private nonprofit and government hospital subsets were 1.3 
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Nonprofit Private Hospitals 
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.70 .020 .62 
.46 .018 
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and 2.3, respectively. The pooled data for each group pre-
dicts as well as if individual subsets are used. 
The scale parameters are not significantly different 
for the private nonprofit production surfaces at the .1 
statistical significance level, but the term was slightly 
higher for the low training group. Therefore, the direc-
tion of the efficiency divergence was as expected. The 
labor input and capital input elasticities are not signifi-
cantly different between the subsets. Figure 12 depicts 
the average cost curves corresponding to the estimated 
production surfaces. 
For the government hospital subsets the low training 
scale parameter exceeds the high training scale parameter 
at the .01 statistical significance level. The summed in-
put elasticities are unity for both groups. The labor in-
put elasticity is significantly higher for the high train-
ing group, while the capital input elasticity is signifi-
cantly higher for the low training group. The average cost 
curves corresponding to these production surfaces are shown 
in Figure 13. 
The observed difference in labor productivity may 
result from an undercounting of labor in real terms in 
training oriented hospitals. Although unpaid trainees were 
not counted as part of the labor input, they may contribute 
to total service output. Therefore, even if paid personnel 
divide their time between training activities and service 
production, a part of their forgone output is recompensed 
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by trainee production. The accompanying reduction in capi-
tal productivity would occur because the capital devoted to 
training is not supplemented by output from a cost-free 
capital resource. In effect, the real quantity of capital 
available for the production of nuclear medicine is over-
stated in training hospitals. Overall, the analysis sug-
gests that training, as a joint product with nuclear medi-
cine output, has a slight but distinguishable effect on 
technical efficiency. 
The Production Frontier 
Since the estimated production surfaces allow some 
observations to lie above each production surface, a true 
production function for nuclear medicine has not been 
represented. It is not possible to select any of the sur-
faces to represent the actual state of the arts in nuclear 
medicine production on an objective basis. The purpose of 
the linear programming model is to estimate a production 
frontier above which no actual observations lie. The con-
straint is then relaxed to allow some extreme output rates 
to lie above the surface until the parameters stabilize. 
Results of the one hundred percent, ninety-eight per-
cent, ninety-six percent, ninety-five percent, ninety-four 
percent, and ninety percent frontiers are listed in Table 
VI. The one hundred percent efficient frontier lies above 
all of the observed input-output combinations. It is char-
acterized by a very high scale parameter (over twice the 
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value of the scale parameter in the regression estimations). 
The sum of the input elasticities, .83, indicates decreas-
ing returns to scale. This is also inconsistent with the 
observation of increasing returns to scale in the regres-
sion estimates. 
Variable 
TABLE VI 
LINEAR PROGRAMMING PRODUCTION SURFACE PARAMETERS 
Alternative Production Frontiers 
ln L 6.51 3.66 3.54 
ln K .50 .59 .70 .68 .68 
ln A .33 .44 .51 .50 .49 
3.50 
.67 
As the most efficient firms are deleted from the esti-
mation allowing them to lie above the estimated surface, 
the result becomes more consistent with the earlier esti-
mates. The ninety-eight percent estimation removed twenty-
six firms from the sample. The scale parameter for the 
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ninety-eight percent efficient production surface is 
thirty-five percent lower than the one hundred percent 
frontier, and its summed input elasticities indicate slight 
economies of scale. The ninety-six percent, the ninety-
five percent, the ninety-four percent, and the ninety per-
cent frontiers exhibit considerable stability, and the 
parameters estimates are fairly consistent with the regres-
sion solutions. Average cost curves associated with the 
production frontiers are in Figure 14. 
By the estimation of the ninety percent frontier, 127 
firms were dropped from the solution. Therefore, the pro-
duction surface parameters were not determined by proprie-
tary firms alone. Although the regression equations indi-
cate that proprietary firms are the most efficient, forty-
six remained by the ninety percent estimation. The remain-
ing comparisons of technical efficiency utilize the ninety 
percent efficient production function as an efficiency 
datum. 
A simple test of structure-efficiency relationships 
utilizes a comparison of average deviations from the pro-
duction frontier. 4 A significant difference would be an 
indication of a structural element affecting hospital tech-
nical efficiency. For the ith hospital the index of effi-
ciency divergence is: 
n. =ca. - Q.) ~ Q. 1 1 1 1 
The average divergences for each hospital subset are 
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reported in Table VII. Any two groups of firms could be 
compared using the following t-statistic: 
( D1 - D2} 
t = 
2 2 t ( s1 + s2 ) 
where n1 and n2 are the average efficiency deviations for 
the segments of the industry under investigation, and s1 
and s2 are the standard errors of the respective divergence 
terms. 
A comparison of the efficiency divergences for the 
competitive intensity data grouping indicates that low com-
petitive hospitals have smaller average efficiency diver-
gences at the .001 statistical significance level. This is 
consistent with the average production function observa-
tions. 
For the profit orientation grouping, proprietary hos-
pitals have a lower average efficiency divergence than 
either nonprofit group at the .001 significance level. 
Private nonprofit hospitals have a lower average efficiency 
divergence than government hospitals at the .01 signifi-
cance level. 
Low service range hospitals in the high competitive 
data set have lower average efficiency divergences than the 
high service range group. The difference between the two 
barely misses significance at the .01 level. Low service 
range hospitals in the low competition data set have 
significantly lower efficiency divergence than the high 
TABLE VII 
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY DIVERGENCES 
Structural Element 
Low Competitive 
High Competitive 
Proprietary 
Efficiency Divergence 
10.5 
21.8 
Private Nonproprietary 
Government 
5.2 
13.4 
18.8 
Low Competitive Intensive 
Low Service Range 
High Service Range 
8.4 
12.8 
High Competitive Intensive 
Low Service Range 
High Service Range 
Low Training 
High Training 
Low Training 
High Training 
21.0 
22.1 
Private Nonproprietary 
12.6 
14.5 
Government 
16.9 
20.8 
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Standard Error 
1.9 
1.8 
1.0 
1.7 
1.3 
2.1 
2.3 
3.9 
4.0 
2.5 
2.4 
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service range group at the .1 statistical significance 
level. 
Neither private nor government hospitals exhibit a 
difference in efficiency divergence on the basis of train-
ing intensity at the .1 statistical significance level. 
Therefore, training intensity appears to have no statisti-
cally significant impact on technical efficiency. 
Timmer states, "the extent of technical efficiency in 
an indust~y is important. Knowledge of any sources of 
inefficiency is doubly important." 5 The final empirical 
task concerning the examination of the research hypotheses 
is to measure the proportion of technical efficiency diver-
gences related to each of the four structural elements 
central to the study. This was done by computing the per-
centage divergence from the ninety percent frontier for 
each hospital and by regressing the divergence terms on the 
four structural elements. Two separate regressions were 
run. The first included all of the hospitals in the data 
universe, and the second included only the observations 
falling on or below the ninety percent frontier. The 
standard error for each coefficient is in parentheses. 
D = 9.8 + .028 CI - .011 NMI + .310 TR + 3.0 G - 5.9 P ( .88) ( .001) ( .004) ( .220) ( .28) (.56) 
D = 10.2 + .027 CI - .016 NMI + .213 TR + 3.4 G - 4.6 P ( .96) ( .001) ( .004) ( .222) ( .29) ( .66) 
For the equation, CI represents the index of competition; 
NMI represents nuclear medicine intensity as a proxy for 
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service range; TR represents relative training level; G is 
a dummy variable for government hospitals; and P is a dummy 
variable for private proprietary hospitals. The regression 
R2 values are .53 and .55, respectively. The four struc-
tural elements under investigation explain over half of 
variations in efficiency divergence. 
The better data fit for the observations falling on or 
below the ninety percent frontier indicates the unusual 
nature of the deleted observations. The odd production 
occurrences that created strange results for the one 
hundred percent and ninety-eight percent frontiers have 
reduced the predictive power of the regression equation. 
The implications of this evidence regarding the rela-
tionship of hospital structure to technical efficiency are 
substantially the same as for the preceding analysis in 
this chapter. Therefore, a brief summary of the results is 
reported below. 
As expected, the competitive intensity coefficient has 
a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 
.0001 level. The competitive intensity term accounts for 
thirty-two to thirty-four percent of variations in effi-
ciency divergence. This result reinforces the importance 
of competitive intensity to technical efficiency that was 
found in the average production surface comparisons. 
The dummy variables for proprietary and government 
hospitals are both statistically significant at the .001 
level. The negative sign on the proprietary hospital term 
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indicates that efficiency divergences are substantially 
lower when a profit incentive exists. Government hospitals 
exhibit systematically greater efficiency divergences than 
other hospitals. Taken together, the administrative orien-
tation variables account for twenty-two to twenty-five per-
cent of variations in hospital efficiency. 
The nuclear medicine intensity term has a negative 
affect on efficiency divergence at the .05 statistical sig-
nificance level. The result here supports the weaker evi-
dence of the effect of service range from the average pro-
duction function comparisons. The average production sur-
face estimations showed that service range has a greater 
impact in lower competitive hospitals. Since over half of 
the hospitals in the data universe were in the low competi-
tion group, these results are consistent. In spite of 
collinearity with competitive intensity, service range has 
exhibited an independent impact on efficiency. The nuclear 
medicine intensity term accounts for about one percent of 
variations in efficiency divergence. 
Relative training level has a small, positive impact 
on technical efficiency divergence. The training coeffi-
cient is not statistically significant at the .1 level. 
The lack of significance for the term may be partly a 
result of collinearity with the administrative orientation 
variables. However, the result is consistent with the 
average production function comparisons which showed only 
slight efficiency differences on the basis of training 
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intensity. The training variable contributes less than .3 
percent to the explanatory power of the equation. 
Structure, Quality Bias, and Efficiency 
Labor and capital have been assumed to be homogeneous 
resource categories. However, it is probable that some 
hospitals have a quality bias in their resource selection. 
If higher quality inputs are more productive and more 
costly, then resource inputs have been understated for 
quality biased hospitals. Resource quality is, to some 
degree, a substitute for resource quantity. Given equal 
rates of input quality, differences in resource quality 
should be reflected in output rates. 
Indications of capital input quality might include 
equipment age, maintainence expenditure, equipment brand, 
or equipment price. Since individual hospital data is not 
available for these indicators, no comparison is possible. 
Labor input quality depends on the human capital 
embodiment of the labor set. Human capital resource 
embodiment is normally measured in terms of education and 
experience. To compare the quality of labor inputs among 
nuclear medicine producers, the average years of education 
and experience requirements were computed for technicians 
in each hospital. 6 These are reported in Table VIII on the 
basis of the four structural elements of the study. 
More competitive hospitals have slightly higher educa-
tion and experience requirements, but the difference is not 
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TABLE VIII 
AVERAGE EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE LEVELS 
Structural Element 
Low Competitive 
Middle Competitive 
High Competitive 
Proprietary 
Private Nonproprietary 
Government 
Education Level (Standard Error) 
2.9 ( • 53) 
2.9 ( • 54) 
3.1 ( .41) 
1.8 ( .45) 
).0 (. 71) 
).2 ( • 55) 
Low ComEetitive Intensive 
Low Service Range 2.7 ( • 83) 
High Service Range 3.4 (. 75) 
Experience Level ( Standard Error) 
4.7 ( 1.0) 
4.2 ( 1. 3) 
4.9 ( 0.9) 
2.6 (0.8) 
5.9 ( 1.0) 
4.7 ( 1. 2) 
5.4 ( 1. 5) 
).6 ( 1.1) 
High ComEetitive Intensive 
Low Service Range 3.1 (.43) 5.8 ( 1.0) 
High Service Range 3.2 ( .66) ).5 ( 1.4) 
Private NonEroErietari 
Low Training 2.8 ( • 55) 4.1 ( 1. 3) 
High Training 4.3 ( .89) 6.2 ( 1. 6) 
Government 
Low Training ).0 ( .65) 3.7 ( .95) 
High Training 4.6 (.52) 5.4 ( 1. 2) 
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significant at the .1 level. Therefore, no additional cost 
or efficiency bias would result from input quality differ-
ences. 
Proprietary hospitals have significantly lower educa-
tion and experience requirements than either of the non-
profit groups. This quality bias suggests that the actual 
efficiency divergence on the basis of profit orientation 
may exceed the divergence observed in this study. 
Higher nuclear medicine intensity hospitals have 
greater average experience requirements in both the high 
and low competitive comparisons. 
are not significantly different. 
Education requirements 
If higher quality in-
creases resource costs, then the production and cost advan-
tages observed for high nuclear medicine intensity hos-
pitals would be partially offset by higher labor costs. 
Hence, the advantages appearing for high nuclear medicine 
intensity hospitals would be reduced if labor quality were 
included as a separate input. 
Training hospitals, as expected, require higher 
quality labor inputs. The difference in education and 
experience levels on the basis of training intensity is 
significant at the .05 level. The use of higher quality 
inputs in training hospitals implies that the actual labor 
input was undercounted for training hospitals. The inclu-
sion of the quality difference would add to the technical 
efficiency and cost divergence between training and non-
training hospitals. 
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Production Function Considerations 
The analysis of technical efficiency in the production 
of nuclear medicine has utilized a comparison of estimated 
production surface parameters for various groups of hos-
pital firms. The selected production function fit a homo-
geneous production relationship characterized by a unitary 
elasticity of substitution but not constrained to constant 
returns to scale. Feldstein assumed a linear homogeneous 
production function in his analysis of the hospital indus-
try.7 Ogur, on the other hand, applied a Constant Elas-
ticity of Substitution (C.E.S.) production function to 
proprietary hospitals and found that the elasticity of 
8 substitution was significantly less than one. 
If hospitals attempt to minimize production costs, 
then a change in relative resource prices would lead to an 
adjustment of the input proportions employed. This effect 
is measured by the elasticity of substitution. The Cobb-
Douglas production function assumes that the elasticity of 
substitution is equal to one. Cramer states, "a signifi-
cant deviation from this value should be taken as evidence 
in favor of an alternative formula."9 
In order to examine the empirical validity of the 
Cobb-Douglas fit of nuclear medicine data, a C.E.S. produc-
tion function was estimated. Of particular importance is 
the elasticity of substitution term. If it appears to have 
a value significantly different from one, then the 
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conclus.ions based on the Cobb-Douglas function comparisons 
would be suspect~ 
The C.E.S. Production Function 
The C.E.S. production function can be stated in a 
general form that is homogeneous of degree one and has a 
constant elasticity of substitution (not necessarily one). 
A common specification of the C.E.S. production function 
. 10 
~s: 
Q = g -1 n • ( 12) 
The scale parameter, g, plays the same role as A in Equa-
tion (5), and the distribution parameter, (1- c), has the 
same significance as a • The substitution parameter, h, 
determines the value of the elasticity of substitution. 
Chaing has demonstrated that the elasticity of substitu-
t . 2 . 11 ~on, , ~s: 
1 
s = ---
1 + h • 
Under the assumption that firms acquire resources to equate 
their marginal products per unit of cost, Equation (11) can 
be reduced to: 
( 13) 
In logarithmic form, the equation can be estimated as a 
multiple linear regression model from data on firm output, 
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labor input, and wage rates: 
ln(Q/L) = ln gh/ (1- c) s + s lnW ( 14) 
The cost minimization assumption for the derivation of 
Equation (13) requires that firms act to maximize profit. 
Since it is clear that all hospitals do not attempt to 
maximize profit, only the proprietary firm data are in-
cluded in the C.E.S. production function estimation. 
Wage data for the estimation of Equation (14) is 
available on a statewide basis from the American College of 
Radiology. Therefore, statewide aggregates of proprietary 
hospital labor input, nuclear medicine output, and wage 
data were used. Forty states have one or more hospitals 
which produce nuclear medicine. 
The fit of the C.E.S. production function resulted in 
the following equation, with standard error terms in 
parentheses: 
ln(Q/L) = 2.3 + .86 W ( .38) ( .15) • 
The regression R2 value of .52 is considerably worse than 
for the Cobb-Douglas fit of proprietary firm data. The 
poorer fit may be partly caused by statewide aggregations, 
the smaller sample size, and the constraint to constant 
returns to scale. (The Cobb-Douglas fit showed significant 
economies of scale.) 
The poorer data fit may also indicate that proprietary 
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hospitals do not acquire factor inputs in response to rela-
tive resource prices. If hospitals do not select the least 
cost combination of resources, then reliance on an estima-
tion technique requiring factor price data is subject to 
serious estimation error. "If the equality of marginal 
product values to the wage rate no longer applies • • • 
there can be no question of estimating input elasticities 
from their relative rewards." 12 
An important result for this study is that the elas-
ticity of substitution term, .$6, is not different from 
unity at the .1 significance level. Therefore, the esti-
mation of the C.E.S. production function offers no grounds 
for rejecting the Cobb-Douglas assumption of a unitary 
elasticity of substitution. This observation, along with 
the superior data fit for the Cobb-Douglas estimation, 
supports the adequacy of the selected model. 
Collinearity among the labor and capital inputs pro-
vides additional evidence of the possibility of factor 
substitution. Production processes with little substitu-
tion flexibility would exhibit considerable collinearity 
among the input variables. Since one resource could not be 
easily substituted for another, both would have to change 
to alter the volume of output. Little collinearity between 
labor and capital variables was observed in any of the 
average production surface regressions. The partial corre-
lation coefficients between labor and capital for each of 
the regression estim~tions are listed in Table IX. The 
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TABLE IX 
PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Structural Element Correlation Coefficient 
Between L and K 
Low Competitive 
Middle Competitive 
High Competitive 
Proprietary 
Private Nonproprietary 
Government 
Low Competitive Intensive 
Low Service Range 
High Service Range 
High Competitive Intensive 
Low Service Range 
High Service Range 
Low Training 
High Training 
Low Training 
High Training 
Private Nonproprietary 
Government 
.263 
.321 
.358 
.101 
.327 
.297 
.161 
.390 
.233 
.427 
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degree of collinearity between labor and capital cannot be 
used to assign a value to the elasticity of substitution, 
but the observation of ldw correlation coefficients is con-
sistent with relative flexibility in the resource mix. 
Other Estimation Problems 
Critics of production function estimates for the hos-
pital industry have cited five primary estimation prob-
lems.13 The significance of the criticisms are discussed 
below in the context of this study. 
First, the assumption of cost minimization may be in-
valid. If hospitals do not attempt to select the cost 
minimizing production technique, then the true production 
function cannot be identified from firm production data. 
This identification problem is not of particular importance 
to this study since the only use of the estimated produc-
tion functions is for efficiency comparisons among various 
structural groups. The use of physical input-output data 
in the Cobb-Douglas framework avoids the necessity of a 
cost minimization assumption for establishing the average 
production surfaces. 
Second, constraints placed on production surface 
parameters may create distortions in the shape of the 
estimated production surface. Although it is impossible 
to avoid some such constraints, tests have been made 
regarding the importance of the constraints imposed. Since 
the summed input elasticities were significantly greater 
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than one in most of the average production surface esti-
mates, a constraint to linear homogeneity would be undesir-
able. On the other hand, the elasticity of substitution 
term does not appear to be significantly different from 
unity. Its restriction should not distort the production 
surface estimates. 
Third, the relevant range of predictive significance 
for an estimated production function may be limited. Lave 
and Lave have emphasized the importance of the relevant 
range of predictive significance. 14 If different produc-
tion surfaces were estimated over small ranges of output, 
a better fit might be obtained. Severe problems of identi-
fying the relevant output range are avoided by allowing 
variations in returns to scale. All production function 
comparisons were made over comparable output ranges. 
Fourth, the nonhomogeneity of inputs and outputs 
reduces the validity of empirical results. The major prob-
lem of output homogeneity has been avoided by the focus on 
nuclear medicine as a specific set of hospital outputs. 
The possibility of qualitative differences in resource in-
puts, and the corresponding effect on technical efficiency, 
was discussed. 
Fifth, the required statistical data may not be com-
parable for all firms. This problem is particularly impor-
tant if firm data comes from a variety of sources. It is 
less serious in this study because all of the primary data 
are drawn from the ACR-ERDA census of nuclear medicine 
producers. Differences in data would occur only to the 
extent of hospital reporting errors. 
Summary 
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This chapter has presented empirical test statistics 
for an examination of the research hypotheses. Substantial 
support was found for the hypotheses concerning competition 
and profit incentives. Support for the hypotheses concern-
ing service range and training was much weaker, although 
the directions of their affects were consistent with the a 
priori reasoning. The regression of the four structural 
elements on efficiency divergence strongly indicates that 
profit incentives and competition account for the bulk of 
efficiency variations. Overall, the four structural ele-
ments have explained over half of efficiency variations 
among producers of nuclear medicine. 
The possibility of variations in resource quality 
among different structural groups was also considered. 
Quality biases in competitive, nonprofit, and training in-
tensive hospitals would increase the efficiency divergence 
related to these elements. It appears that the quality 
bias observed for high nuclear medicine intensive hospitals 
would reduce the efficiency advantage that was observed for 
those groups. 
The examination of the C.E.S. production function 
showed that the elasticity of substitution term is not 
significantly different from one. The Cobb-Douglas 
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production function also appears to provide a better data 
fit than the C.E.S. form. Finally, other problems of 
production function estimation were evaluated within the 
context of this study. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Parameters estimated from cross-section data typi-
cally provide a poorer data fit than those estimated from 
time series data. 
2c. P. Timmer, "Using a Probabilistic Production Fron-
tier as a Measure of Technical Efficiency," Journal of 
Political Economy, LXXIX (1971), p. 782. 
)Jonathan Ogur, "The Nonprofit Firm: A Test of the 
Theory for the Hospital Industry," Journal of Economics and 
Business, XI (Winter, 1974), p. 118. 
4Ibid., P• 119. 
5Timmer, P• 777. 
6nata is available from the ACR-ERDA census of nuclear 
medicine producers. 
7Martin Feldstein, "Hospital Cost Variations and Case 
Mix Differences," Medical Care, IV (April, 1971), p. 95. 
g Ogur, p. 117. 
9J. s. Cramer, Empirical Econometrics (Amsterdam, 
1971), p. 245. 
10Alpha C. Chaing, Fundamentals of Mathematical 
Economics (New York, 1967), p. 381. 
11Ibid. 
12cramer, p. 250. 
13Judith Lave and Lester Lave, "Economic Analysis for 
Health Service Efficiency," Applied Economics, IV (1970), 
P• 300. 
14Ibid. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, 
AND RECOlf~ENDATIONS 
The theoretical and empirical evidence presented in 
this study implies that hospital structure has an important 
impact on technical efficiency. This chapter summarizes 
the conclusions and implications of the theoretical and 
statistical evidence and puts them in perspective relative 
to other studies of the hospital industry. The chapter 
also recommends other lines for empirical study that might 
extend from this analysis. 
The primary limitation on the findings of the study is 
the restriction to nuclear medicine production relation-
ships. A broader analysis of the hospital industry, and 
an in depth study of any particular proposal, should pre-
cede specific policy action. 
Conclusions 
The most significant conclusion of the study is that 
over half of the observed variations in technical effi-
ciency in the production of nuclear medicine are attributed 
to the four structural elements under investigation. The 
measured impact of each element was consistent with 
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reasoning from the theoretical models of hospital behavior. 
The conclusions presented below are related to the CED 
efficiency proposals. 
Competition for staff physicians reduces technical 
efficiency. Competitive hospitals were found to accumulate 
excess capital resources. Personnel inputs are apparently 
adjusted in response to actual service requirements even in 
status-biased hospitals. The degree.of efficiency diver-
gence between low and high competitive intensity hospitals 
increases as the output of nuclear medicine increases. 
This observation suggests that the accumulation of excess 
capital becomes increasingly important as output expands. 
The American College of Radiology is currently considering 
the effect of regional planning and cooperation for nuclear 
medicine production. Such planning might reduce the impor-
tance of nuclear medicine capacity for the attraction of 
staff physicians, thereby reducing the incentive to acquire 
excess capacity. The evidence of this research indicates 
that a substantial improvement in technical efficiency 
would be possible. If regional planning also induces fewer 
but larger nuclear medicine producers, an additional effi-
ciency benefit would be the economies of scale that were 
observed for the industry. 
Profit incentives also have a significant efficiency 
impact. Although some of the evidence indicates that pro-
prietary hospitals do not equate marginal productivities 
with resource prices, there was considerable evidence that 
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they achieve higher output levels per unit of input. 
Therefore, the emphasis on creations of profit incentives 
offers a promising method for improving technical 
efficiency. 
Service range had less than the expected affect on 
technical efficiency, particularly when qualitative differ-
ences in resource are also considered. The independent 
effect of service range was most important in the absence 
of capacity accumulation biases. If competition on the 
basis of excess capacity could be reduced, then reductions 
in service range could also produce efficiency gains. 
The output effect of in-house manpower training, 
coincident with the production of nuclear medicine, was 
observed to be fairly unimportant. Any attempt to re-
organize the training system would require a comparison of 
the relative impacts of alternative systems. Under the 
current system, it appears that trainee productivity 
largely compensates for the teaching and supervisory 
efforts of regular nuclear medicine personnel. Moreover, 
the value of firm expenditures on trainees should be com-
pared to future firm productivity. Current training 
expenditures might reflect, in part, a wage bill allocation 
to hiring and training expense. Since the current training 
system has a minimal impact on technical efficiency, possi-
ble changes in the system do not suggest major efficiency 
gains. 
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Consistency with Other Studies 
The analysis of nuclear medicine provides a unique 
view of structure-efficiency relationships in the hospital 
industry. The common problem of output heterogeneity was 
avoided by focusing on a relatively standardized inter-
mediate hospital product. Firm efficiency was directly 
related to hospital managerial behavior since hospital 
decisions link the measured input and output variables. 
Some of the results support other empirical findings; some 
contradict other findings; and some suggest new lines of 
interpretation for other findings. 
As is consistent with other works, both competition 
and profit incentives were found to have considerable 
effect on technical efficiency. Other studies have 
asserted relationships between both of these and technical 
efficiency. 
Two fairly unique observations appeared. First, sig-
nificant economies of scale were observed for most of the 
production surface estimates. Many studies of the hos-
pital industry have found little evidence of scale econo-
mies for hospital services. Lave and Lave are "skeptical 
of evidence showing no economies of scale because of the 
heterogeneity of services offered." 1 This study sheds 
some light on possible reasons for the lack of measured 
scale economies in other studies of hospital production. 
Economies of scale in the nuclear medicine industry were 
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least significant in those hospitals with the strongest 
capacity biases. Since previous analysis has concentrated 
on capacity biased hospitals, their conclusions would 
apply only within the set of technically inefficient 
producers. 
The second unexpected observation concerns the rela-
tive unimportance of service range and training intensity. 
Davis has noted that service range and training are impor-
tant efficiency determinants which give an efficiency bias 
to proprietary hospitals. 2 This reasoning has been used 
to cast doubts on studies of efficiency in proprietary 
hospitals. In this study, service range was not signifi-
cantly different for proprietary and nonproprietary hos-
pitals. Moreover, the independent affect of service range 
on efficiency was small. Similarly, the effect of training 
appeared to be insignificant. These results lend support 
to the observation of greater technical efficiency in pro-
prietary hospitals as found in other studies. 
The findings of this study also indicate the validity 
of various theories of hospital behavior. Competition and 
profit incentives both effect the intensity of input accu-
mulation. This evidence of status biased behavior implies 
that some hospitals do not attempt to maximize output or 
net revenue. The status biases are best explained on a 
theoretical basis within the utility maximization model. 
The accumulation of excess capacity is most consistent with 
the maximization of some quantity-quality combination. The 
12S 
poor data fit of the C.E.S. production function is not 
consistent with cost minimization with respect to output 
alone, but is consistent with regard to cost minimization 
of some quantity-quality combination. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
Two general areas for additional study of the hospital 
industry could extend from this analysis. First, there is 
a need for more evidence concerning the general behavior of 
hospitals. The identification and examination of other 
specialized hospital services could be used to supplement 
the evidence from this study. An efficiency comparison 
format similar to the one applied to nuclear medicine might 
be employed. 
Further investigations of scale economies in hospital 
production are also suggested. An attempt could be made to 
adjust for the status biases of individual hospitals. The 
observations of scale economies were most significant in 
the hospitals with lowest status biases, thereby demon-
strating the importance of such an adjustment. 
Finally, further investigations of the impact of in-
house manpower training on technical efficiency should be 
developed. The result of this research is inconsistent 
with the commonly held view that training hospitals are 
less efficient. 
The second area for additional study is the nuclear 
medicine industry itself. A more detailed investigation 
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of production relationships would be a useful decision 
making tool for hospital managers. A larger set of re-
source categories could be defined, and the alternative 
input sets for each potential output level could be speci-
fied. Then a linear programming model could be used to 
describe the technical production constraints. For any 
given set of resource prices, the optimum input combina-
tion could be found. 
Summary 
This study has attempted to measure the impact of 
four elements of hospital structure on technical efficiency 
in the production of nuclear medicine. The research 
hypotheses have stated that systematic differences in hos-
pital efficiency are related to the level of competition, 
the profit incentives, the service range, and the training 
intensity of hospitals. Theoretical and empirical evidence 
has revealed a substantial relationship between these 
structural elements and technical efficiency. The findings 
have also contributed to the understanding of current 
theories of hospital behavior and other hospital production 
relationships. The results indicate that technical effi-
ciency gains could be achieved through reduced competitive 
intensity, stronger profit orientation, and reduced service 
range in the hospital industry. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Judith Lave and Lester Lave, "Economic Analysis for Health Service Efficiency," Applied Economics, IV (1970), P• 279. 
2Karen Davis, "Economic Theories of Behavior in Non-profit Private Hospitals," Economic and Business Bulletin, XXIV (Winter, 1972), P• 4. 
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